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…a journal of
CAP history,
feature articles,
scholarly works,
and stories of
interest.
CIVIL AIR PATROL
CAP National Historical Journal
Volume I, Issue IV: JUL- SEP 2014
The Civil Air Patrol National Historical Journal is published quarterly by professional volunteer staff. As academic historians by trade,
we recognize the demand for quality publications reflecting a variety of interests to Civil Air Patrol readers, and strive to offer the
best in feature and thought provoking articles. We trust you will enjoy what the e-journal has to offer and will consider contributing
to the mission of our staff in providing a forum for the great traditions of our organization.
Editor's Note: Following the enemy
attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941,
the inevitable mobilization of U.S. military
forces progressed. What followed in terms
of civilian, non-combatant participation in
the war effort on what was tantamount to
"combat missions" however, would be a
lingering question. The following article
highlights some of the Civil Air Patrol's
early interaction in WWII.
Guarding the Home
Skies
Drew Ames
C
ivil Air Patrol pilot Henry Cross
woke up in the water. The plane he
was flying had crashed into the Atlantic
twenty miles off Rehoboth Beach,
Delaware, at 4:50 p.m. on July 21, 1942.
Now it had sunk, Cross was hurt, and he
couldn’t find Charles Shelfus, his
observer and radio man.
Within an hour, Hugh Sharp,
commander of the Civil Air Patrol base
at Rehoboth, arrived at the scene in a
Sikorsky seaplane with Edmond Edwards
as his observer. He landed in the rough
water. Eight- to ten-foot swells tossed
the Sikorsky about and damaged its left
pontoon. The plane started filling with
water. Edwards hauled Cross aboard in
spite of the heavy swells, and after searching in vain for Shelfus, the trio
turned toward the shore at 6:20 p.m. They could not take off because
the sea was too rough, so they had to taxi all the way to shore. Shortly
after they set out on their westerly course, the left pontoon sank.
While Sharp piloted the plane,
Edwards crawled out onto the right
pontoon and hung onto the bomb
rack to help balance the plane. He
was completely immersed several
times during the trip home. A Coast
Guard picket boat met the Sikorsky
at 8:50 p.m. and towed it and its
passengers to Chincoteague,
Virginia. They arrived at 11:45.
Later, in February 1943, President
Franklin Roosevelt personally
presented the two men with the Air
Medal for “meritorious service” in a
ceremony at the White House.1
PHOTO CREDIT: National Archives
T
he Civil Air Patrol was only about eight months old when Cross’s
surveillance plane plunged into the sea. An organization of
volunteer civilian pilots and support personnel, the Civil Air Patrol
(often called the CAP) was formed just days prior to the surprise
bombing of Pearl Harbor. In the aftermath of the attack, the federal
1
"Civil Air Patrol: For Valor — Citation To Accompany Award Of Air Medal For
Edmond I. Edwards," Civil Air Patrol, accessed September 13, 2014, http://
archives.sercap.us/resources/site1/Research_Center/Monographs/MonographFor_Valor.pdf.
1
government prohibited all civilian flights
except airline flights. Some of the first
planes allowed back into the sky a few
days later were those of the CAP.
In a short time, the CAP was helping
fight the enemy that lurked just off
America’s shores.
Credit for creating the Civil Air Patrol
goes to Gill Robb Wilson, aviation
pioneer, president of the National
Aeronautics Association, and aviation
editor of the New York Herald Tribune.
Wilson had visited Germany in the mid
1930s and saw how the Germans were
preparing for war. He became
concerned that the United States was
not ready to deal with threats from
overseas. Inspired in part by Germany’s
civilian glider program for training pilots,
Wilson developed an idea for mobilizing
America’s civilian pilots into a corps of
“flying minutemen.” In 1941, he pitched
his idea in Washington, DC, and gained
the support of Army Air Corps
commander Major General Hap Arnold
and key members of his staff, along with
a number of prominent private citizens.2
I
n time, the idea became reality, and
President Roosevelt founded the Civil
Air Patrol by executive order on
December 1, 1941.3 It was placed under
the authority of the director of the
Office of Civilian Defense, Fiorello
LaGuardia—another pilot from the First
World War, and a former mayor of New
York City. Major General John Curry was
appointed the first national commander,
2
"Lt Gill Robb Wilson," Find a Grave,
accessed December 3, 2006, http://
www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&
GRid=14291740.
3
Administrative Order No. 9
and the CAP was organized into wings, with one wing per state.
Experienced personnel were put in command of the wings,
and then the recruiting began.
Continued on page 4
A Power to Reckon With ...
K.J. Efinger
What I have to say is this: In the preparations for national defense we
have to follow an entirely new course because the character of future
wars is going to be entirely different from the character of past wars.
I say: The World War was only a point on the graph curve showing
the evolution of the character of war; at that point the graph curve
makes a sharp swerve showing the influence of entirely new
factors...clinging to the past will teach us nothing useful for the
future, for that future will be radically different from anything that
has gone before. The future must be approached from a new angle. 1
Guilio Douhet
P
articipation in the Aerospace Education program is not limited to a
study of the great pioneers of military and civilian aviation, the
physics of flight, or the history of organizational policies. The expansion
of cadet activities to involve robotics and STEM research kits is part of
the growth we can expect to see over the next decade.2 The rocketry
standard is not enough. The Civil Air Patrol currently has programs
introducing CAP cadets to the preparatory doctrines and application of
RC piloting (CAP-MARC) as well as assistance provided by CAP units to
the U.S. military in terms of UAV training missions and simulations.3 The
argument that a UAV is nothing more than a remotely controlled
aircraft with FPV (First-Person View) is a little too simplistic. 4
1
Douhet, 26-27.
2
Civil Air Patrol United States Air Force Auxiliary, 2014, "Aerospace Education
Civil Air Patrol Stem Kit Program,"
http://www.capmembers.com/aerospace_education/general/stemkit/ (accessed
September 1, 2014).
3
Jeremy Hsu, "With Drone Shortage, Air Force Pilots Train With Cessnas
Dressed Up Like Predators," Popular Science, October 2, 2009,
http://www.popsci.com/military-aviation-amp-space/article/2009-10/human-pilots-flydrones-military-training/ (accessed September 1, 2014).
4
The term UAV, is somewhat nebulous in the sense that all unmanned aircraft
have been referred to variously as UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Unmanned
Aerospace Vehicle) UAs, UASs, RPA, RAPS, and a multitude of designations for combat
platforms. The URL provided will at least provide links, articles, and current legislation as
well as nomenclature to aid in a better understanding of a growing technology. It is not
the purpose to define or categorize these systems in a two to three page article. Neither
the U.S. Government nor the international community has fully come to any consensus
on taxonomy. Federal Aviation Administration, August 2014, 2014, "Unmanned Aircraft
Systems," http://www.faa.gov/uas// (accessed September 19, 2014).
2
It perhaps denigrates the very research and
development into the technology. Still, such aircraft in
the context of military applications becomes the “drone”
or UAV, however, with far more sophisticated aerial
combat and guidance systems than we might perhaps
realistically envision.
The 21st century
has brought
unprecedented
change, but not so
dissimilar from the
dawn of the previous
century where such
was the harbinger of
things to come. Along
with the advent of
manned flight,
submarines, and
mechanized infantry,
the face of battle had
significantly changed
by the end of the
Great War. The rapidity with which these changes took
place created a world where waging war against an
enemy was no longer a person-to-person affair. It was
mass-conflict, and impersonal. The subsequent theories
on how such conflicts would be settled, at what level,
and to what extent the civilian population would be
involved was in question as well. The waters were clearly
muddled in the early days of the Second World War. The
history of the Civil Air Patrol speaks loudly to some of
PHOTO CREDIT: Public Domain
Staff & Acknowledgements
National Commander
Maj Gen Joseph R. Vazquez
Chief Historian
Col Frank A. Blazich Jr.
National Historical Editor
Lt Col Richard B. Mulanax
National Historical Journal Editor
Capt Kurt Efinger
these issues as civilians in 1942 donned flight suits and
took to the air in search of enemy submarines and signs
that the home front was subject to external threats.
From the beginning, the Civil Air Patrol was a force
multiplier. The organization today is not so far removed
from the front-lines of military ideological thinking.
T
he idea of penetrating enemy lines via powered
flight is as old as manned flight itself. Though we
owe much to Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell’s
contributions to air-power theory, the ideas shared by
Italian aviation pioneer Gulio Douhet deserve some
attention in this arena—in particular when it comes to
today’s concept of remote aerial penetration.5 It is
becoming increasingly more popular to see the
intervention of UAVs as more than just an augmentation
of a larger, more purposeful force. There is enough
“buy-in” to the notion that manned flight in combat will
someday disappear altogether. Perhaps it will, but we
must also remember that the various perspectives on
singular applications of advancing technologies have
never really proved efficient enough in supplanting the
human interactive component on a direct combat level.
The early air-power theorists of the WWI era are long
forgotten, it would seem, outside of purely academic
circles. The travesty in this is that we fail to appreciate
the unique and revolutionary way of thinking where they
were in fact visionaries as much as anything else. To
have posited what they did at a time when air-power
was still in its infancy is remarkable. Not all theories
proved to be “intact” over time—though we have much
to consider when looking at them. As Douhet stated, “it
was impossible to invade the enemy’s territory without
5
The "Kettering Bug" was the first unmanned aircraft with
varying degrees of automated systems developed to deliver a
"torpedo" or missile. Hap Arnold was intimately involved in its
development, and so enthusiastic over the concept that he
resurrected the research prior to, and during WWII—calling on
Kettering once again. The result was a "glide bomb" and later "glide
torpedo." The latter was used in the Pacific in WWII with some
degree of success according to Daso in a later publication. Dik Daso,
"Origins Of Airpower: Hap Arnold's Early Career In Aviation
Technology, 1903-1935," Airpower Journal, Winter, 1996,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj96/win96/d
aso.html. (accessed September 19, 2014).
3
first breaking through his defensive lines.”6 This is the
“linchpin” upon which Douhet’s air-power theory rests.
Consider the monumental challenge faced by the Allied
powers in both world wars of penetrating enemy lines—
it was no easy task for aircraft to breach the territorial
boundaries established by men, concrete and steel. The
Allied invasion of Europe in WWII was as much a well
executed plan as it was in some cases luck when the
planes took to the air—individuals more or less “won the
day” when meeting various military objectives. Things
fell into place because of men who quickly worked
around the chaos of the moment, and wove contingency
plans into the fabric of their operations. For that reason,
it went considerably well. Still, some forty years into
manned flight, we were only just able to engage the
enemy behind a perimeter without having to first “break
through his defensive lines.”7
The invasion of Normandy consequently proved that it
would not have been wholly possible to meet the
objectives without a combined land, sea, and air assault
on German positions. Consequently, air-power alone did
not save the day, or win the war. Neither would it in
later conflicts. Nevertheless, it is easy to believe with the
advent of newer technologies that such creations win
wars—until we consider that even the proper
application of technology is not necessarily capable of
delivering such a claim.
W
hen we investigate further the historical
paradigms created by ascendant technologies,
we find that a resulting asymmetric situation is often
rendered only moderately successful after the swift
development of countermeasures. The submarine only
temporarily created challenging situations for the British
Admiralty until they not only developed the “hard”
technologies to deal with the menacing threat, but
innovated by creating convoys that would thwart
potential attacks on ships as well.
Continued on page 7
The views expressed in the Civil Air
Patrol National Historical Journal
are those of the authors only and
do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Journal Staff ,
Editorial Board, the Civil Air Patrol,
its officers or members, nor the
United States Air Force.
(continued from page 2)
H
enry E. Phipps joined the CAP on the day it was
formed. Born in Baltimore, Maryland, in
December 1913, Phipps earned his pilot’s license on July
17, 1940. Word about the CAP spread quickly around
Baltimore’s Logan Field, where Phipps was flying, and he
and a number of his fellow pilots signed up. “I thought it
would be a good idea to have a roster of civilian pilots
who could be useful in the event of an emergency,
which at that time was six days before the emergency
happened!” Phipps said.4 Though composed primarily of
civilian volunteers, the CAP was an auxiliary of the Army
Air Corps and was organized along military lines. The
volunteers wore uniforms identical to army uniforms,
except that their epaulettes and shoulder braids
were red. 5
The CAP planes did not fly immediately on December
1, 1941. During the first few days, the volunteers
studied training manuals provided by the army and
flew practice missions. At Logan Field, Phipps said,
“we did close order drill.” The pilots flew simulated
searches and worked on their mapping skills. 6
4
Henry E. Phipps, interview by Drew Ames, December 6, 2006.
5
6
Dino Ferrrari, trans., The Command of the Air, by Giulio
Douhet (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 9.
7
Editor’s Note
Ibid.
Lt Col A. William Schell Jr. Civil Air Patrol, interviewed by
Drew Ames, December 3, 2006.
6
Phipps.
4
G
erman submarines began attacking shipping off
the eastern coast of the United States in January
1942. America was poorly prepared for the onslaught.
Cargo and tanker ships often steamed with their lights
on, advertising themselves as sitting ducks. East Coast
cities, not consistently blacked out at night for several
months after the war started, stood there aglow, easy
targets and landmarks for the enemy U-boats.
Meanwhile, the navy and coast guard had few ships
available for anti-submarine duty.
As shipping losses increased, the government sanctioned
the CAP to patrol the coast for a 90-day trial period. The
oil companies chipped in $25,000 toward the effort, and
the CAP established three coastal bases: Base 1 in
Atlantic City, New Jersey; Base 2 in Rehoboth Beach,
Delaware; and Base 3 in Lantana, Florida. The trial
succeeded, and 18 additional bases were established
along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.7
As the war progressed and the coastal patrol mission got
into full swing, the ranks of the CAP swelled. Many of the
volunteers were fathers of young children, were too old
or too young to serve in the armed forces, or had been
rejected by the military for health reasons. Many CAP
veterans did go on to serve in the armed forces, and the
CAP touted its role in training pilots and giving them the
opportunity to log flight time before they went on to be
military pilots.8
Not all CAP volunteers were pilots, of course. The CAP
needed mechanics, radio operators, office staff, and
other support personnel. Women volunteered, too,
including some women pilots. Women were not allowed
to fly coastal patrol missions, however, because that
duty was considered too hazardous. The coastal patrol
mission lasted 18 months, ending in the summer of 1943
when the German submarines pulled back from the East
Coast due to America’s increasingly effective antisubmarine tactics.9
The people who volunteered for coastal patrol missions
made their volunteer work their full-time job and lived
on or near the bases. The CAP pilots flew during the day,
escorting merchant ships and looking for submarines.
They were in constant radio contact with their bases so
they could report any subs they spotted and coordinate
rescues for ships that had been torpedoed.10 Each plane
had two people on board, a pilot and an observer (who
was also usually a pilot). The observer handled the radio,
and both men searched for submarines. For added
safety, two planes flew on each mission.
Despite all the steps taken to ensure safety, coastal
patrol missions were hazardous. During the 18 months
the CAP flew coastal patrol missions, it lost 90 planes in
the sea. Most of the crew members were rescued, but
26 men died from drowning or exposure.11 The coastal
patrol pilots generally flew at least once a day and
sometimes as many as four times a day. They patrolled
out to 50 miles from the shore. The fleet of airplanes at
each base consisted mostly of planes owned by the
pilots. Fairchild 24s and Stinson 10As were common.
Most bases had at least one seaplane, such as a
Grumman Widgeon. CAP personnel received a modest
expense allowance, and the owners of base aircraft were
given an additional expense allowance for aircraft
maintenance based on their plane’s horsepower and the
number of hours it was operated.12
P
hipps took leave from his job as a product manager
for a heating equipment manufacturer in Baltimore
in November 1942 and transferred to Base 2 in
Rehoboth Beach. He flew coastal patrol for 10 months,
logging more than 500 hours of patrol time before the
base closed on September 1, 1943. Submarines were
9
Blascovich.
10
Phipps.
11
Blascovich.
12
Phipps.
7
Col. Leonard Blascovich Civil Air Patrol, interviewed by
Drew Ames, December 3, 2006.
8
Walter Karig, "Civil Air Patrol," Liberty Magazine July 1942, 16.
5
notoriously difficult to spot, according to Phipps. In all
the time that he flew on coastal patrol, he saw only one.
“It was from the Netherlands, on the surface, flying the
flag of its country on the way to the US for sanctuary,” he
said. “We met it about 50 miles out and escorted it in.”
Officially, the CAP is credited with spotting 173
submarines and attacking 57 of them with bombs or
depth charges.13 At the start, CAP planes were unarmed.
Their procedure was to radio their base when they
spotted a submarine, and then the army or navy would
send an aircraft to meet them and attack the sub.
Eventually, CAP planes were armed with either a single
100-pound bomb or a single 300-pound depth charge.
Which weapon a plane carried depended on its size
and horsepower.
T
he weather on the East Coast can be unpredictable
and often caused problems for CAP planes. Phipps
once had to stretch his four hours’ worth of fuel to four
hours and 10 minutes because of adverse weather at
Rehoboth. “The planes held 40 gallons of fuel, and we
figured on 10 gallons per hour,” he recalled. “We
patrolled for three hours and had extra fuel for safety.
We flew a three-hour patrol and turned back when we
were relieved. When we were at Rehoboth Bay, we ran
into a solid wall of fog. We had an instant white out.”
Phipps immediately turned 180 degrees and got out of
the fog. The pilot of the plane flying with him was rated
to fly by instruments and was able to land in spite of the
low visibility. “The base radio operator suggested that I
land on the beach somewhere near one of the Coast
Guard stations,” Phipps said, “but that didn’t appeal to
me.” He instead turned south toward the Chincoteague
Naval Air Station, slightly more than 50 miles south of
Rehoboth. He asked his base commander, Major Hugh
Sharp, to call the navy base and ask for permission to
land there. Permission was quickly granted. Phipps
continued south. “When I got south around Ocean City
[Maryland] I began to worry that I had made a mistake,
so to save fuel, I throttled back some,” he said. “then I
had to make a decision as to whether I would stay over
land or take a shortcut over Chincoteague Bay. I took the
shortcut over the bay, figuring that if I had to make a
ditching there, it wouldn’t be as bad as in the ocean
because there are no waves or swells to contend with.
I made an approach at the naval base to the first runway
I saw. I couldn’t communicate with the tower because
they were on a different frequency, but they knew we
were coming and gave us a green light and I made a
landing. As soon as we were down they put a ‘follow me’
Jeep in front of us, and they led us to the fuel dump. I
never did find out how much fuel it took, but there
couldn’t have been much left in the plane.” Phipps, his
observer, and a CAP crew that had diverted earlier
enjoyed the hospitality of the navy for two days until the
weather cleared. Phipps says the navy treated them very
well and was grateful for the work of the CAP.14
When the coastal patrol mission ended in the summer of
1943, CAP pilots flew other missions, including towing
targets for aerial gunnery practice, border patrol, and
search-and-rescue operations. After the war, the CAP
became a non-profit organization and was transferred
from the army to the newly formed US Air Force in 1948.
At its peak in 1944, the CAP had 125,000 members and
45,000 pilots. Fifty-seven CAP members died from
accidents, including the twenty-six who died while flying
coastal patrol.15
M
ost Americans were unaware of the CAP’s vigil off
the Atlantic and Gulf coasts (and even of the
existence of combat in those areas). The US government
did little to correct this at first, and at the end of the
war was slow to recognize the CAP’s contribution to
national security.
April 1948, President Harry Truman began awarding Air
Medals to CAP members who flew 200 or more hours on
coastal patrol, though deserving ground crew members
and support staffers got no special honors. Eventually,
Truman awarded the Air Medal to 824 CAP members
—including Phipps, whose more than 500 hours easily
14
13
Blascovich.
Phipps.
15
Blascovich.
6
qualified him for the honor.16 Phipps left the CAP when
the base at Rehoboth closed in September 1943. He
then got a job with the army, inspecting bombers
manufactured at the Glenn L. Martin factory in
Baltimore. When the war ended, he returned to his
civilian job and remained there until he retired.
Phipps, who turned 93 in December 2006,
continued flying, making his last flight as pilot-incommand on July 28, 2001. 17
On September 11, 2001, an unprovoked attack on
American soil caused the government to ground civilian
flights. Soon, however, a Civil Air Patrol plane took off to
take aerial photos of the destruction. It was the first
civilian aircraft allowed back into the sky.
"Guarding The Home Skies," America in WWII April 2007 is
reprinted with permission from America in WWII magazine
and the article's author. Mr. Ames is an environmental
planner with the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation,
and a freelance writer on aviation history.
Letters to the Editor
The Editor at the CAP NHJ welcomes your
comments and feedback. Please submit letters
for review by emailing the editor at the address
provided. All comments will be reviewed by the
entire editorial staff prior to publication. The
CAP NHJ Editorial Staff reserves the right to
refuse publication to any member based on the
content of the letter. CAP members are
encouraged to maintain a professional, and
collegial
attitude
when
submitting
correspondence. kefinger@sercap.us
(continued from page 4)
D
ouhet saw a problem in defeating an enemy where
ground was given and taken ad nauseam—is this
not the basic argument for promoting “other means”
through which one may penetrate enemy lines? In
reality, this was his experience in the First World War
and influential enough to further cement whatever ideas
he had already been postulating from his early familiarity
with aircraft. He had a keen understanding that an all-air
force would play a larger role in armed conflict—mostly
his belief that bombers would be most necessary and
efficacious—and was willing as much as Mitchell to
advocate for such a position within the military
command structure. Seeing a need for separate
branches in the military where the land forces were not
inevitably the hub of military command was rather
revolutionary. Douhet saw the relationship as both
synergistic as well as separate—which was yet to come
into its own with regard to the United States Air Force
after WWII.8 By that time American military planners had
witnessed the very powerful part air-power had in
determining the outcome in war, but still, not an
exclusive dependence thereupon.
The notion that air-power would dominate and render
perimeters and parameters alike null and void was a key
point of Douhet’s doctrine. In his mind, there was a
definitive line drawn in the past between the
combatants and noncombatants in war, but that the
future would make little if any distinction. The
application of mass air-power directed at the enemy’s
center of gravity and/or population centers would blur
these lines. He fails to see aircraft as having limitations
imposed upon it by concurrent technology.9 As
mentioned previously, countermeasures would to some
great effect pose a formidable resistance to airspace
penetration in spite of the means through which aircraft
in WWII were in fact able to overcome this obstacle.
8
16
Blascovich.
17
Phipps.
National Defense Act of 1947
9
David MacIsaac, Makers of Modern Strategy: From
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986), 630.
7
But that situation (first having to penetrate an
enemy’s lines in order to invade his territory) is a
thing of the past; for now it is possible to go far
behind the fortified lines of defense without first
breaking through them. It is air power which makes
this possible.10
With this premise in mind, a relationship has been
established between air-power and offensive strategy.
Douhet’s point that air-power is the solution to bringing
victory on the battlefield becomes clear. This same
ideology surfaces from time to time in our own age
when military materiel breeches known conventional
applications. The deployment of UAVs in war zones is
not novel, but so far, has not altered offensive strategies
considerably as the totality of operations are directed
towards surveillance—not engagement.
Countermanding technologies will soon up the ante with
respect to the current autonomy enjoyed by military
UAVs as no development enjoys unfettered freedom
very long. Douhet espoused that “To have command of
the air means to be in a position to prevent the enemy
from flying while retaining the ability to fly oneself.”11
Weapons technology reached developmental stages that
showed promise for an adequate ground-based air
defense system as time progressed. The successes
achieved in Allied bombing raids in WWII do not negate
the losses incurred. It would be very short-sighted for
any student of the subject to ignore Allied losses in
acquisition of enemy targets within their borders. The
argument is not that aircraft were in any way inefficient
at penetrating enemy airspace, but that it would never
prove to be as simple as Douhet perhaps believed.
All three seem to have at least confirmed that fixed-wing
aircraft would have a place in the various services as an
integral part of providing support and leadership roles,
but neither went so far as to determine air-power the
“all that ends all.”13 Mitchell and Douhet would have
agreed that air-power had a clearly defined role even if
they differed on what exactly that was. Douhet was
certainly revolutionary in his forward-thinking on the
subject, but as shortsighted as A.T. Mahan and others in
perceiving this new technology as “exclusive” in terms of
future applications in war and the coincident strategies.
Kurt Efinger is the former A5 Deputy Chief of Staff at
Southeast Region HQ where he now serves as Assistant
Historian. He is also the CAP NHJ Editor at NHQ, a full-time
teacher and Adjunct Professor of History at Indian River State
College.
S
ome of the early war theories Douhet proposed
could have landed him the very same fate as naval
proponent Alfred Thayer Mahan, but fortunately, they
were seized upon by Fuller, Liddell Hart, and Mitchell.12
10
Ibid., 9.
11
Ibid.,24.
12
A.T. Mahan was seized upon by the British Admiralty
(excluding Fisher), German Kaiser, and Theodore Roosevelt alike—
there was no question as to the popularity of his treatise The
Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. However, the mass
assembly of navies rested largely in the historical context and
necessity for transporting large armies—Salamis, Normandy (1066),
Lepanto, and Normandy (1944)—and not so much with the idea of
navy battling against navy with few exceptions. This paradigm proved
to be decidedly different from where others like Julian Corbett
believed the future would operate concerning the strategic purpose
of naval power.
13
MacIsaac, 635.
8
Civil Air Patrol Communications:
The Formative Years
Michael Marek
W
hen the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) received its
Congressional charter in 1947, and the
organization transformed from wartime military support
to peacetime missions, it soon became apparent that
radio communications would be essential. It was a time
when telephone calls had expensive per-minute long
distance charges, conference calls were unheard of, and
there were few other communication options for
managing a national organization structured like CAP.
The Air Force tasked Civil Air Patrol to create a High
Frequency (HF) radio system that was characterized by
high mobility and flexibility. In addition, the Air force
expected the system to be at the disposal of Civil
Defense agencies, when not required for direct support
of Air Force missions (Wilson, 1952).
Details of the first steps taken to develop the CAP radio
communications system are hard to find almost 70 years
later, but CAP’s Report to Congress for the year 1947,
reported on the fledgling radio system. It said that in
order to support the organization’s goals for a farreaching flying program, it became necessary to create a
communications network that connected the then-51
wings of the organization (the 48 states, Hawaii, and the
District of Columbia) and its 150,000 members (CAP,
1948). As a result, the Air Force loaned each CAP wing a
“heavy duty radio set” (Wilson, 1952, p.4).
A considerable amount of war surplus communication
equipment was also acquired and the Air Force allocated
two HF radio frequencies to CAP. As of May 1948, over
500 individual CAP-HF stations had been licensed via the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). To
demonstrate the capability of the network at that time,
the annual report verbal presentation to a Congressional
banquet in May of 1947 was transmitted “to all of our
state wings and their components through our own
network” (CAP, 1948, p. 5).
The 1949 National Commander’s Report to Congress
(CAP, 1949) specifically included an organizational
objective of providing “an auxiliary radio net of mobile,
fixed and portable stations to augment the armed forces
and commercial communication systems in case of local,
state and national emergencies” (p. 24). At this point,
3,420 CAP stations had been licensed, including the
original 51 radios loaned by the Air Force, plus many
other radios from “donable property sources” (p. 22).
The radios operated at anywhere from 1 to 400 watts.
Many members, it was reported, already owned
equipment capable of operating on the frequencies
assigned to CAP. Each state had set up, or was in the
process of setting up, a communications training
program. In 1949, CAP was using voice communications
and Morse Code (CW), plus California Wing operated a
radio-teletype system.
The 1949 Commander’s Report proclaimed the
efficiency of the new radio network, which had only
been a plan on paper a year earlier, exemplified by its
functioning during emergency blizzard conditions in the
West (CAP, 1949). The report said that in many cases the
CAP radio network was the only link some isolated
communities had to the outside world during the
blizzards.
T
he 1950 annual report (CAP, 1950) described rapid
growth, with the network passing 6,000
applications for FCC licenses. But the report also
candidly described problems in the system, mostly
stemming from a “lack of ‘know how’ among members”
(p. 6). To address this, CAP’s national headquarters
initiated a program of communications conferences. In
the first year, ten were held around the country, and the
report concluded that “the results were gratifying in
terms of interest and enthusiasm as well as
improvement in efficiency of operation” (p. 6).
1951 marked a growing emphasis on mobile CAP radio
communications (CAP, 1951). Licensed radio stations
had increased to 9,000, but the focus of communications
program management was turning to improving the
structure and discipline of the network. Evoking images
of fixed-base radio stations, the annual report said the
9
network was “called down from the attics and out of the
cellars to roll on wheels – ready to move on a moment’s
notice.” CAP received no new influx of military radio
hardware during 1951, due to the complicated
procedure necessary to process surplus or obsolete
equipment through the General Services Administration.
But 21 September 1951 saw the first major disaster
relief test of the new CAP communications system, a gas
main explosion in Brighton, New York.
The town of Brighton was rocked by a series of
explosions in an underground vault that housed pressure
regulators for gas distribution lines (Jones, Platt &
Berger, 1952). High pressure gas gained entry into many
residences, resulting in an additional disastrous series of
explosions and fires. Three people died and 23 were
injured. Fifteen residences were totally destroyed, 25
were damaged, and unofficial estimates of damage
ranged from $1-1.5 million, or over $9-13 million
in 2014 dollars.
All communication with the outside world was cut off
because many residents heard the news while working
in nearby Rochester. The phone exchange was jammed
by their attempts to telephone home (Auf der Heide,
1989). Civil Air Patrol communicators bridged the gap in
less than an hour (Burnham, 1955). They deployed
mobile radios to critical locations throughout the
community, relaying specific requests for help to a fixed
station outside the disaster area. The CAP emergency
net allowed rescue workers to dispatch the specific
types of needed equipment and assistance to each
affected location.
T
he benefits of CAP’s fleet of mobile radios were
illustrated again in late 1952 when forest fires
swept Virginia (CAP, 1952). “Almost before the word
‘FIRE’ had gone out Civil Air Patrol communicators were
leaving their jobs in shops, offices, plants and garages
heading for the danger zone” (p. 20). The CAP
communicators worked side-by-side with the fire
fighters for two weeks. The annual report noted that
when fire destroyed ground telephone lines to isolated
ranger stations, CAP radio operators took their portable
equipment into the fire zones to furnish
communications, cruising the roads to report the fire
fighters’ progress. Meanwhile, radio-equipped CAP
aircraft orbited above, reporting degree of fire control,
calling attention to new outbreaks, and guiding fire
crews around danger areas. This allowed fire supervisors
to make the best possible distribution of their firefighting assets (Burnham, 1955).
The radio systems in these missions largely used HF
frequencies. The author has heard anecdotal reports of
HF radios mounted in CAP aircraft, circa 1960 or earlier,
which required long trailing wire antennas. The antenna
was manually cranked out after takeoff and cranked
back in before landing. Amplitude modulated VHF
aviation band radios were rare, and few were available
within CAP. It is unclear from historical accounts
which form of aircraft radio was used during
these fire missions.
I
n 1952, Col. William P. Lear was communications
advisor to Air Force Maj. Gen. Lucas V. Beau, the
active duty CAP-USAF commander from 1947-1955
(Barnhart, 2006; Wilson, 1952). The Deputy Chief of Staff
for Communications was Lt. Col. Walter Wilson. Wilson
wrote that the communications staff was developing
plans for a lightweight, portable, battery-powered VHF
radio that could be used in aircraft, automobiles, boats,
and even on horseback or handheld. The organization
made a concerted effort to urge electronics
manufacturing firms to make such a radio for the CAP
market (CAP, 1953). The 1954 annual report (CAP, 1954)
conveyed the good news that the Reisner Corporation of
Hagerstown, Md., was producing a suitable air/ground
VHF radio and that Gonset, Crico, and Lettine were also
producing equipment usable by CAP.
1952 had seen a major reorganization of the CAP
communications system, based on the principal of
“communications is command” (CAP, 1953, p. 20). The
goal of the reorganization was to establish a definite
command-via-radio capability for every commander,
from National Headquarters down to the lowest echelon
of the organization. Commanders and communications
officers were encouraged to decommission fixed
stations and install the equipment in the automobiles of
10
individual members, where they would be of practical
use during operational missions. The effort resulted in a
9:1 ratio of mobile to base stations at the end of 1952,
compared to 5:1 in 1951.
The groundwork was also laid in 1952 for new
standardized training materials and a standardized basic
radio course designed for CAP cadets. Indeed, the 1953
annual report (CAP, 1953) indicated that 5,000 radiotelephone manuals had been printed for training
purposes. An associated instructor’s guide was
reported to have resulted in many radio classes at
the squadron level (CAP, 1954).
I
n the 1950s, the call sign for the National
Headquarters station at Bolling AFB, Washington DC,
was VPØ (Wilson, 1952). Region stations carried
additional numerals matching region numbers used by
CAP, such as VPØ1 at Mitchell AFB for Northeast Region
(Cormier, Goodwin, & Squires, 1959). Following the
launch of the first Russian and American satellites, all of
the VPØ stations transmitted satellite orbital elements
for the general public at scheduled times, to allow
observers to locate them.
Although a wide range of radios and power supplies
were in use in this era, the most popular transmitter was
said to be the Hallicrafters BC-610 (Wilson, 1952). It was
originally built for the U.S. Army Signal Corps during
World War II based on a civilian model, transmitted 500
watts, and was capable of voice and CW/Morse Code
operation (Radiomuseum, n.d.) but it was also large,
heavy, and not very portable.
1953 saw creation of the National Communications
Committee, consisting of selected CAP volunteer
members (CAP, 1953). The 1953 annual report noted
that the impetus for communications planning now
rested with the experienced volunteer communicators
on the committee, as well as with the active duty staff of
the National Commander. Later in its existence, the
National Communications Committee consisted of the
region deputy chiefs of staff for communication, but
the makeup of the group in 1953 was not specified in
the annual report.
By 1954, CAP came to the realization that it had many
inactive radio stations (CAP, 1954). Steps were taken to
weed out these inactive stations so that planning and
reporting could be based on more accurate data. In
addition, restrictions were planned on fixed HF stations
controlled by CAP to eliminate their use for amateur
radio and other unauthorized uses.
Another major event that spurred the
professionalization of the CAP radio system was the
Atlantic seaboard landfall of Hurricane Hazel during the
morning hours of 15 October 1954 (CAP, 1954).
Commercial power went down and commercial
broadcast radio stations were off the air. CAP rescue
workers and mobile units maintained contact with the
outside world, stringing field telephone wires and using
brute force to keep antennas in operation, despite 115
mile per hour winds. Two communicators, Florence
Fitzgerald and Thelma Hale of Richmond, Va., received
bruises and lacerations while fighting to keep their
stations on the air.
CAP’s 1954 hurricane response, as well as its work
during floods on both the Atlantic Seaboard and the
Pacific Coast, had the by-product of improving the
overall efficiency of its radio nets, as well as leading to
changes to give the system even more mobility
(CAP, 1955).
As the result of the hands-on lessons during the
formative years of the CAP Communications system, a
formal Net-type structure evolved to replace the looser
operation of earlier years. The late 1950s, therefore,
marked the transition from a preliminary exploration of
radio use into a structured, professional radio
communications system, frequently passing formal voice
traffic for management of the CAP organization, and for
conducting its missions. The structure of HF nets and
related formal message and operating practices would
serve CAP well for decades.
Michael Marek is a Professor of Electronic Media at Wayne
State College and serves as an Assistant National
Communications Officer at the CAP NHQ.
11
Works Cited: Civil Air Patrol Communications:
The Formative Years
Auf der Heide, E. (1989). Disaster response: Principles of preparation
and coordination. Center of Excellence in Disaster
Management & Humanitarian Assistance.
http://www.sheltercentre.org/sites/default/files/CVMosby
_DisasterResponsePrinciples.pdf
Barnhart, K. (2006). Castle’s core values. Civil Air Patrol Volunteer,
Nov-Dec 2006, 34-35.
http://capnhq.custhelp.com/ci/fattach/get/509/0/filename
/Castle+CAP+CommandersVolunteer_NovDec_06_Final_75dpi-14.pdf
Burnham, F. (1955). CAP to the rescue. Popular Mechanics Magazine,
103(2), 81-88 & 264-270.
http://books.google.com/books?id=390DAAAAMBAJ&print
sec=frontcover
Civil Air Patrol (1948). 1947 Report. Address delivered at the CAP
Congressional dinner, Washington DC, May 1948. Bolling
AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1947_748722E8
D25CA.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1949). Civil Air Patrol Auxiliary of the U. S. Air Force
Annual conference. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1949_00C3A3B
31F036.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1950). Annual Report to Congress 1950. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1950_F403C9F8
22E0C.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1951). Report for Congress for 1951. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1951_FFC3C27
AD1D59.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1952). Annual Report Civil Air Patrol Auxiliary of the
United States Air force for 1952. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1952_8D184B3
F628D7.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1953). Annual Report for the year ended December
31. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1953_83232DB
34E54C.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1954). Annual Report Civil Air Patrol Auxiliary of the
United States Air Force for 1954. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1954_7FCABC0
E127E4.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1955). Annual Report for the year ended December
31. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1955_D122092
4549A5.pdf
Cormier, L. N., Goodwin, N., & Squires, R. K. (1959). Simplified
satellite prediction from modified orbital elements. IGY
Satellite Report Series Number 7. Washington D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences.
http://fas.org/spp/military/program/track/predict.pdf
Jones, G. W., Platt, D. H. & Berger, L. B. (1952). Investigation of gas
explosions in Brighton, N. Y., September 21, 1951. United
States Department of the Interior.
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015078469650
Radiomuseum (n.d.). HT 4 / BC-610.
http://www.radiomuseum.org/r/hallicraft_ht_4_ht4.html
Wilson, W. (1952). Mobility of communications. Radio & Television
News, 47(5), 35-37.
http://www.americanradiohistory.com/Archive-RadioNews/50s/Radio-News-1952-05-R.pdf
Call for Submissions
The Civil Air Patrol National Historical Journal (NHJ)
welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries not
exceeding 2,000 words on any topic relating to the history
of the Civil Air Patrol, or military/civilian aviation history.
CAP’s history extends to the present day, and the NHJ
seeks accounts of on-going activities and missions, as well
as those of earlier years.
All historiographical works and essays must be submitted
in Chicago Manual of Style (CMS), or they will be rejected
unless otherwise permitted. We encourage authors to
submit digital photographs (minimal resolution of 300 dots
per inch) and illustrations for publication. All content
should be the work of the author or open source.
Adjustments to pixel saturation, color and size will be
made according to the editorials staff’s recommendations.
Please note that when submitted to the editor at the Civil
Air Patrol National Historical Journal, all works and related
media are released from copyright infringements if
published.
Editorial changes are at the sole discretion of the editorial
staff, but will be discussed with the author prior to
publication, and require a signed release from the author.
The CAP NHJ editorial staff reserves the right to
refuse any work submitted. All submissions must be
sent as MS Word attachments and mailed to the
editor at kefinger@sercap.us.
12
CAP history,
feature articles,
scholarly works,
and stories of
interest.
CIVIL AIR PATROL
CAP National Historical Journal
Volume I, Issue IV: JUL- SEP 2014
The Civil Air Patrol National Historical Journal is published quarterly by professional volunteer staff. As academic historians by trade,
we recognize the demand for quality publications reflecting a variety of interests to Civil Air Patrol readers, and strive to offer the
best in feature and thought provoking articles. We trust you will enjoy what the e-journal has to offer and will consider contributing
to the mission of our staff in providing a forum for the great traditions of our organization.
Editor's Note: Following the enemy
attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941,
the inevitable mobilization of U.S. military
forces progressed. What followed in terms
of civilian, non-combatant participation in
the war effort on what was tantamount to
"combat missions" however, would be a
lingering question. The following article
highlights some of the Civil Air Patrol's
early interaction in WWII.
Guarding the Home
Skies
Drew Ames
C
ivil Air Patrol pilot Henry Cross
woke up in the water. The plane he
was flying had crashed into the Atlantic
twenty miles off Rehoboth Beach,
Delaware, at 4:50 p.m. on July 21, 1942.
Now it had sunk, Cross was hurt, and he
couldn’t find Charles Shelfus, his
observer and radio man.
Within an hour, Hugh Sharp,
commander of the Civil Air Patrol base
at Rehoboth, arrived at the scene in a
Sikorsky seaplane with Edmond Edwards
as his observer. He landed in the rough
water. Eight- to ten-foot swells tossed
the Sikorsky about and damaged its left
pontoon. The plane started filling with
water. Edwards hauled Cross aboard in
spite of the heavy swells, and after searching in vain for Shelfus, the trio
turned toward the shore at 6:20 p.m. They could not take off because
the sea was too rough, so they had to taxi all the way to shore. Shortly
after they set out on their westerly course, the left pontoon sank.
While Sharp piloted the plane,
Edwards crawled out onto the right
pontoon and hung onto the bomb
rack to help balance the plane. He
was completely immersed several
times during the trip home. A Coast
Guard picket boat met the Sikorsky
at 8:50 p.m. and towed it and its
passengers to Chincoteague,
Virginia. They arrived at 11:45.
Later, in February 1943, President
Franklin Roosevelt personally
presented the two men with the Air
Medal for “meritorious service” in a
ceremony at the White House.1
PHOTO CREDIT: National Archives
T
he Civil Air Patrol was only about eight months old when Cross’s
surveillance plane plunged into the sea. An organization of
volunteer civilian pilots and support personnel, the Civil Air Patrol
(often called the CAP) was formed just days prior to the surprise
bombing of Pearl Harbor. In the aftermath of the attack, the federal
1
"Civil Air Patrol: For Valor — Citation To Accompany Award Of Air Medal For
Edmond I. Edwards," Civil Air Patrol, accessed September 13, 2014, http://
archives.sercap.us/resources/site1/Research_Center/Monographs/MonographFor_Valor.pdf.
1
government prohibited all civilian flights
except airline flights. Some of the first
planes allowed back into the sky a few
days later were those of the CAP.
In a short time, the CAP was helping
fight the enemy that lurked just off
America’s shores.
Credit for creating the Civil Air Patrol
goes to Gill Robb Wilson, aviation
pioneer, president of the National
Aeronautics Association, and aviation
editor of the New York Herald Tribune.
Wilson had visited Germany in the mid
1930s and saw how the Germans were
preparing for war. He became
concerned that the United States was
not ready to deal with threats from
overseas. Inspired in part by Germany’s
civilian glider program for training pilots,
Wilson developed an idea for mobilizing
America’s civilian pilots into a corps of
“flying minutemen.” In 1941, he pitched
his idea in Washington, DC, and gained
the support of Army Air Corps
commander Major General Hap Arnold
and key members of his staff, along with
a number of prominent private citizens.2
I
n time, the idea became reality, and
President Roosevelt founded the Civil
Air Patrol by executive order on
December 1, 1941.3 It was placed under
the authority of the director of the
Office of Civilian Defense, Fiorello
LaGuardia—another pilot from the First
World War, and a former mayor of New
York City. Major General John Curry was
appointed the first national commander,
2
"Lt Gill Robb Wilson," Find a Grave,
accessed December 3, 2006, http://
www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&
GRid=14291740.
3
Administrative Order No. 9
and the CAP was organized into wings, with one wing per state.
Experienced personnel were put in command of the wings,
and then the recruiting began.
Continued on page 4
A Power to Reckon With ...
K.J. Efinger
What I have to say is this: In the preparations for national defense we
have to follow an entirely new course because the character of future
wars is going to be entirely different from the character of past wars.
I say: The World War was only a point on the graph curve showing
the evolution of the character of war; at that point the graph curve
makes a sharp swerve showing the influence of entirely new
factors...clinging to the past will teach us nothing useful for the
future, for that future will be radically different from anything that
has gone before. The future must be approached from a new angle. 1
Guilio Douhet
P
articipation in the Aerospace Education program is not limited to a
study of the great pioneers of military and civilian aviation, the
physics of flight, or the history of organizational policies. The expansion
of cadet activities to involve robotics and STEM research kits is part of
the growth we can expect to see over the next decade.2 The rocketry
standard is not enough. The Civil Air Patrol currently has programs
introducing CAP cadets to the preparatory doctrines and application of
RC piloting (CAP-MARC) as well as assistance provided by CAP units to
the U.S. military in terms of UAV training missions and simulations.3 The
argument that a UAV is nothing more than a remotely controlled
aircraft with FPV (First-Person View) is a little too simplistic. 4
1
Douhet, 26-27.
2
Civil Air Patrol United States Air Force Auxiliary, 2014, "Aerospace Education
Civil Air Patrol Stem Kit Program,"
http://www.capmembers.com/aerospace_education/general/stemkit/ (accessed
September 1, 2014).
3
Jeremy Hsu, "With Drone Shortage, Air Force Pilots Train With Cessnas
Dressed Up Like Predators," Popular Science, October 2, 2009,
http://www.popsci.com/military-aviation-amp-space/article/2009-10/human-pilots-flydrones-military-training/ (accessed September 1, 2014).
4
The term UAV, is somewhat nebulous in the sense that all unmanned aircraft
have been referred to variously as UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Unmanned
Aerospace Vehicle) UAs, UASs, RPA, RAPS, and a multitude of designations for combat
platforms. The URL provided will at least provide links, articles, and current legislation as
well as nomenclature to aid in a better understanding of a growing technology. It is not
the purpose to define or categorize these systems in a two to three page article. Neither
the U.S. Government nor the international community has fully come to any consensus
on taxonomy. Federal Aviation Administration, August 2014, 2014, "Unmanned Aircraft
Systems," http://www.faa.gov/uas// (accessed September 19, 2014).
2
It perhaps denigrates the very research and
development into the technology. Still, such aircraft in
the context of military applications becomes the “drone”
or UAV, however, with far more sophisticated aerial
combat and guidance systems than we might perhaps
realistically envision.
The 21st century
has brought
unprecedented
change, but not so
dissimilar from the
dawn of the previous
century where such
was the harbinger of
things to come. Along
with the advent of
manned flight,
submarines, and
mechanized infantry,
the face of battle had
significantly changed
by the end of the
Great War. The rapidity with which these changes took
place created a world where waging war against an
enemy was no longer a person-to-person affair. It was
mass-conflict, and impersonal. The subsequent theories
on how such conflicts would be settled, at what level,
and to what extent the civilian population would be
involved was in question as well. The waters were clearly
muddled in the early days of the Second World War. The
history of the Civil Air Patrol speaks loudly to some of
PHOTO CREDIT: Public Domain
Staff & Acknowledgements
National Commander
Maj Gen Joseph R. Vazquez
Chief Historian
Col Frank A. Blazich Jr.
National Historical Editor
Lt Col Richard B. Mulanax
National Historical Journal Editor
Capt Kurt Efinger
these issues as civilians in 1942 donned flight suits and
took to the air in search of enemy submarines and signs
that the home front was subject to external threats.
From the beginning, the Civil Air Patrol was a force
multiplier. The organization today is not so far removed
from the front-lines of military ideological thinking.
T
he idea of penetrating enemy lines via powered
flight is as old as manned flight itself. Though we
owe much to Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell’s
contributions to air-power theory, the ideas shared by
Italian aviation pioneer Gulio Douhet deserve some
attention in this arena—in particular when it comes to
today’s concept of remote aerial penetration.5 It is
becoming increasingly more popular to see the
intervention of UAVs as more than just an augmentation
of a larger, more purposeful force. There is enough
“buy-in” to the notion that manned flight in combat will
someday disappear altogether. Perhaps it will, but we
must also remember that the various perspectives on
singular applications of advancing technologies have
never really proved efficient enough in supplanting the
human interactive component on a direct combat level.
The early air-power theorists of the WWI era are long
forgotten, it would seem, outside of purely academic
circles. The travesty in this is that we fail to appreciate
the unique and revolutionary way of thinking where they
were in fact visionaries as much as anything else. To
have posited what they did at a time when air-power
was still in its infancy is remarkable. Not all theories
proved to be “intact” over time—though we have much
to consider when looking at them. As Douhet stated, “it
was impossible to invade the enemy’s territory without
5
The "Kettering Bug" was the first unmanned aircraft with
varying degrees of automated systems developed to deliver a
"torpedo" or missile. Hap Arnold was intimately involved in its
development, and so enthusiastic over the concept that he
resurrected the research prior to, and during WWII—calling on
Kettering once again. The result was a "glide bomb" and later "glide
torpedo." The latter was used in the Pacific in WWII with some
degree of success according to Daso in a later publication. Dik Daso,
"Origins Of Airpower: Hap Arnold's Early Career In Aviation
Technology, 1903-1935," Airpower Journal, Winter, 1996,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj96/win96/d
aso.html. (accessed September 19, 2014).
3
first breaking through his defensive lines.”6 This is the
“linchpin” upon which Douhet’s air-power theory rests.
Consider the monumental challenge faced by the Allied
powers in both world wars of penetrating enemy lines—
it was no easy task for aircraft to breach the territorial
boundaries established by men, concrete and steel. The
Allied invasion of Europe in WWII was as much a well
executed plan as it was in some cases luck when the
planes took to the air—individuals more or less “won the
day” when meeting various military objectives. Things
fell into place because of men who quickly worked
around the chaos of the moment, and wove contingency
plans into the fabric of their operations. For that reason,
it went considerably well. Still, some forty years into
manned flight, we were only just able to engage the
enemy behind a perimeter without having to first “break
through his defensive lines.”7
The invasion of Normandy consequently proved that it
would not have been wholly possible to meet the
objectives without a combined land, sea, and air assault
on German positions. Consequently, air-power alone did
not save the day, or win the war. Neither would it in
later conflicts. Nevertheless, it is easy to believe with the
advent of newer technologies that such creations win
wars—until we consider that even the proper
application of technology is not necessarily capable of
delivering such a claim.
W
hen we investigate further the historical
paradigms created by ascendant technologies,
we find that a resulting asymmetric situation is often
rendered only moderately successful after the swift
development of countermeasures. The submarine only
temporarily created challenging situations for the British
Admiralty until they not only developed the “hard”
technologies to deal with the menacing threat, but
innovated by creating convoys that would thwart
potential attacks on ships as well.
Continued on page 7
The views expressed in the Civil Air
Patrol National Historical Journal
are those of the authors only and
do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Journal Staff ,
Editorial Board, the Civil Air Patrol,
its officers or members, nor the
United States Air Force.
(continued from page 2)
H
enry E. Phipps joined the CAP on the day it was
formed. Born in Baltimore, Maryland, in
December 1913, Phipps earned his pilot’s license on July
17, 1940. Word about the CAP spread quickly around
Baltimore’s Logan Field, where Phipps was flying, and he
and a number of his fellow pilots signed up. “I thought it
would be a good idea to have a roster of civilian pilots
who could be useful in the event of an emergency,
which at that time was six days before the emergency
happened!” Phipps said.4 Though composed primarily of
civilian volunteers, the CAP was an auxiliary of the Army
Air Corps and was organized along military lines. The
volunteers wore uniforms identical to army uniforms,
except that their epaulettes and shoulder braids
were red. 5
The CAP planes did not fly immediately on December
1, 1941. During the first few days, the volunteers
studied training manuals provided by the army and
flew practice missions. At Logan Field, Phipps said,
“we did close order drill.” The pilots flew simulated
searches and worked on their mapping skills. 6
4
Henry E. Phipps, interview by Drew Ames, December 6, 2006.
5
6
Dino Ferrrari, trans., The Command of the Air, by Giulio
Douhet (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 9.
7
Editor’s Note
Ibid.
Lt Col A. William Schell Jr. Civil Air Patrol, interviewed by
Drew Ames, December 3, 2006.
6
Phipps.
4
G
erman submarines began attacking shipping off
the eastern coast of the United States in January
1942. America was poorly prepared for the onslaught.
Cargo and tanker ships often steamed with their lights
on, advertising themselves as sitting ducks. East Coast
cities, not consistently blacked out at night for several
months after the war started, stood there aglow, easy
targets and landmarks for the enemy U-boats.
Meanwhile, the navy and coast guard had few ships
available for anti-submarine duty.
As shipping losses increased, the government sanctioned
the CAP to patrol the coast for a 90-day trial period. The
oil companies chipped in $25,000 toward the effort, and
the CAP established three coastal bases: Base 1 in
Atlantic City, New Jersey; Base 2 in Rehoboth Beach,
Delaware; and Base 3 in Lantana, Florida. The trial
succeeded, and 18 additional bases were established
along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.7
As the war progressed and the coastal patrol mission got
into full swing, the ranks of the CAP swelled. Many of the
volunteers were fathers of young children, were too old
or too young to serve in the armed forces, or had been
rejected by the military for health reasons. Many CAP
veterans did go on to serve in the armed forces, and the
CAP touted its role in training pilots and giving them the
opportunity to log flight time before they went on to be
military pilots.8
Not all CAP volunteers were pilots, of course. The CAP
needed mechanics, radio operators, office staff, and
other support personnel. Women volunteered, too,
including some women pilots. Women were not allowed
to fly coastal patrol missions, however, because that
duty was considered too hazardous. The coastal patrol
mission lasted 18 months, ending in the summer of 1943
when the German submarines pulled back from the East
Coast due to America’s increasingly effective antisubmarine tactics.9
The people who volunteered for coastal patrol missions
made their volunteer work their full-time job and lived
on or near the bases. The CAP pilots flew during the day,
escorting merchant ships and looking for submarines.
They were in constant radio contact with their bases so
they could report any subs they spotted and coordinate
rescues for ships that had been torpedoed.10 Each plane
had two people on board, a pilot and an observer (who
was also usually a pilot). The observer handled the radio,
and both men searched for submarines. For added
safety, two planes flew on each mission.
Despite all the steps taken to ensure safety, coastal
patrol missions were hazardous. During the 18 months
the CAP flew coastal patrol missions, it lost 90 planes in
the sea. Most of the crew members were rescued, but
26 men died from drowning or exposure.11 The coastal
patrol pilots generally flew at least once a day and
sometimes as many as four times a day. They patrolled
out to 50 miles from the shore. The fleet of airplanes at
each base consisted mostly of planes owned by the
pilots. Fairchild 24s and Stinson 10As were common.
Most bases had at least one seaplane, such as a
Grumman Widgeon. CAP personnel received a modest
expense allowance, and the owners of base aircraft were
given an additional expense allowance for aircraft
maintenance based on their plane’s horsepower and the
number of hours it was operated.12
P
hipps took leave from his job as a product manager
for a heating equipment manufacturer in Baltimore
in November 1942 and transferred to Base 2 in
Rehoboth Beach. He flew coastal patrol for 10 months,
logging more than 500 hours of patrol time before the
base closed on September 1, 1943. Submarines were
9
Blascovich.
10
Phipps.
11
Blascovich.
12
Phipps.
7
Col. Leonard Blascovich Civil Air Patrol, interviewed by
Drew Ames, December 3, 2006.
8
Walter Karig, "Civil Air Patrol," Liberty Magazine July 1942, 16.
5
notoriously difficult to spot, according to Phipps. In all
the time that he flew on coastal patrol, he saw only one.
“It was from the Netherlands, on the surface, flying the
flag of its country on the way to the US for sanctuary,” he
said. “We met it about 50 miles out and escorted it in.”
Officially, the CAP is credited with spotting 173
submarines and attacking 57 of them with bombs or
depth charges.13 At the start, CAP planes were unarmed.
Their procedure was to radio their base when they
spotted a submarine, and then the army or navy would
send an aircraft to meet them and attack the sub.
Eventually, CAP planes were armed with either a single
100-pound bomb or a single 300-pound depth charge.
Which weapon a plane carried depended on its size
and horsepower.
T
he weather on the East Coast can be unpredictable
and often caused problems for CAP planes. Phipps
once had to stretch his four hours’ worth of fuel to four
hours and 10 minutes because of adverse weather at
Rehoboth. “The planes held 40 gallons of fuel, and we
figured on 10 gallons per hour,” he recalled. “We
patrolled for three hours and had extra fuel for safety.
We flew a three-hour patrol and turned back when we
were relieved. When we were at Rehoboth Bay, we ran
into a solid wall of fog. We had an instant white out.”
Phipps immediately turned 180 degrees and got out of
the fog. The pilot of the plane flying with him was rated
to fly by instruments and was able to land in spite of the
low visibility. “The base radio operator suggested that I
land on the beach somewhere near one of the Coast
Guard stations,” Phipps said, “but that didn’t appeal to
me.” He instead turned south toward the Chincoteague
Naval Air Station, slightly more than 50 miles south of
Rehoboth. He asked his base commander, Major Hugh
Sharp, to call the navy base and ask for permission to
land there. Permission was quickly granted. Phipps
continued south. “When I got south around Ocean City
[Maryland] I began to worry that I had made a mistake,
so to save fuel, I throttled back some,” he said. “then I
had to make a decision as to whether I would stay over
land or take a shortcut over Chincoteague Bay. I took the
shortcut over the bay, figuring that if I had to make a
ditching there, it wouldn’t be as bad as in the ocean
because there are no waves or swells to contend with.
I made an approach at the naval base to the first runway
I saw. I couldn’t communicate with the tower because
they were on a different frequency, but they knew we
were coming and gave us a green light and I made a
landing. As soon as we were down they put a ‘follow me’
Jeep in front of us, and they led us to the fuel dump. I
never did find out how much fuel it took, but there
couldn’t have been much left in the plane.” Phipps, his
observer, and a CAP crew that had diverted earlier
enjoyed the hospitality of the navy for two days until the
weather cleared. Phipps says the navy treated them very
well and was grateful for the work of the CAP.14
When the coastal patrol mission ended in the summer of
1943, CAP pilots flew other missions, including towing
targets for aerial gunnery practice, border patrol, and
search-and-rescue operations. After the war, the CAP
became a non-profit organization and was transferred
from the army to the newly formed US Air Force in 1948.
At its peak in 1944, the CAP had 125,000 members and
45,000 pilots. Fifty-seven CAP members died from
accidents, including the twenty-six who died while flying
coastal patrol.15
M
ost Americans were unaware of the CAP’s vigil off
the Atlantic and Gulf coasts (and even of the
existence of combat in those areas). The US government
did little to correct this at first, and at the end of the
war was slow to recognize the CAP’s contribution to
national security.
April 1948, President Harry Truman began awarding Air
Medals to CAP members who flew 200 or more hours on
coastal patrol, though deserving ground crew members
and support staffers got no special honors. Eventually,
Truman awarded the Air Medal to 824 CAP members
—including Phipps, whose more than 500 hours easily
14
13
Blascovich.
Phipps.
15
Blascovich.
6
qualified him for the honor.16 Phipps left the CAP when
the base at Rehoboth closed in September 1943. He
then got a job with the army, inspecting bombers
manufactured at the Glenn L. Martin factory in
Baltimore. When the war ended, he returned to his
civilian job and remained there until he retired.
Phipps, who turned 93 in December 2006,
continued flying, making his last flight as pilot-incommand on July 28, 2001. 17
On September 11, 2001, an unprovoked attack on
American soil caused the government to ground civilian
flights. Soon, however, a Civil Air Patrol plane took off to
take aerial photos of the destruction. It was the first
civilian aircraft allowed back into the sky.
"Guarding The Home Skies," America in WWII April 2007 is
reprinted with permission from America in WWII magazine
and the article's author. Mr. Ames is an environmental
planner with the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation,
and a freelance writer on aviation history.
Letters to the Editor
The Editor at the CAP NHJ welcomes your
comments and feedback. Please submit letters
for review by emailing the editor at the address
provided. All comments will be reviewed by the
entire editorial staff prior to publication. The
CAP NHJ Editorial Staff reserves the right to
refuse publication to any member based on the
content of the letter. CAP members are
encouraged to maintain a professional, and
collegial
attitude
when
submitting
correspondence. kefinger@sercap.us
(continued from page 4)
D
ouhet saw a problem in defeating an enemy where
ground was given and taken ad nauseam—is this
not the basic argument for promoting “other means”
through which one may penetrate enemy lines? In
reality, this was his experience in the First World War
and influential enough to further cement whatever ideas
he had already been postulating from his early familiarity
with aircraft. He had a keen understanding that an all-air
force would play a larger role in armed conflict—mostly
his belief that bombers would be most necessary and
efficacious—and was willing as much as Mitchell to
advocate for such a position within the military
command structure. Seeing a need for separate
branches in the military where the land forces were not
inevitably the hub of military command was rather
revolutionary. Douhet saw the relationship as both
synergistic as well as separate—which was yet to come
into its own with regard to the United States Air Force
after WWII.8 By that time American military planners had
witnessed the very powerful part air-power had in
determining the outcome in war, but still, not an
exclusive dependence thereupon.
The notion that air-power would dominate and render
perimeters and parameters alike null and void was a key
point of Douhet’s doctrine. In his mind, there was a
definitive line drawn in the past between the
combatants and noncombatants in war, but that the
future would make little if any distinction. The
application of mass air-power directed at the enemy’s
center of gravity and/or population centers would blur
these lines. He fails to see aircraft as having limitations
imposed upon it by concurrent technology.9 As
mentioned previously, countermeasures would to some
great effect pose a formidable resistance to airspace
penetration in spite of the means through which aircraft
in WWII were in fact able to overcome this obstacle.
8
16
Blascovich.
17
Phipps.
National Defense Act of 1947
9
David MacIsaac, Makers of Modern Strategy: From
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986), 630.
7
But that situation (first having to penetrate an
enemy’s lines in order to invade his territory) is a
thing of the past; for now it is possible to go far
behind the fortified lines of defense without first
breaking through them. It is air power which makes
this possible.10
With this premise in mind, a relationship has been
established between air-power and offensive strategy.
Douhet’s point that air-power is the solution to bringing
victory on the battlefield becomes clear. This same
ideology surfaces from time to time in our own age
when military materiel breeches known conventional
applications. The deployment of UAVs in war zones is
not novel, but so far, has not altered offensive strategies
considerably as the totality of operations are directed
towards surveillance—not engagement.
Countermanding technologies will soon up the ante with
respect to the current autonomy enjoyed by military
UAVs as no development enjoys unfettered freedom
very long. Douhet espoused that “To have command of
the air means to be in a position to prevent the enemy
from flying while retaining the ability to fly oneself.”11
Weapons technology reached developmental stages that
showed promise for an adequate ground-based air
defense system as time progressed. The successes
achieved in Allied bombing raids in WWII do not negate
the losses incurred. It would be very short-sighted for
any student of the subject to ignore Allied losses in
acquisition of enemy targets within their borders. The
argument is not that aircraft were in any way inefficient
at penetrating enemy airspace, but that it would never
prove to be as simple as Douhet perhaps believed.
All three seem to have at least confirmed that fixed-wing
aircraft would have a place in the various services as an
integral part of providing support and leadership roles,
but neither went so far as to determine air-power the
“all that ends all.”13 Mitchell and Douhet would have
agreed that air-power had a clearly defined role even if
they differed on what exactly that was. Douhet was
certainly revolutionary in his forward-thinking on the
subject, but as shortsighted as A.T. Mahan and others in
perceiving this new technology as “exclusive” in terms of
future applications in war and the coincident strategies.
Kurt Efinger is the former A5 Deputy Chief of Staff at
Southeast Region HQ where he now serves as Assistant
Historian. He is also the CAP NHJ Editor at NHQ, a full-time
teacher and Adjunct Professor of History at Indian River State
College.
S
ome of the early war theories Douhet proposed
could have landed him the very same fate as naval
proponent Alfred Thayer Mahan, but fortunately, they
were seized upon by Fuller, Liddell Hart, and Mitchell.12
10
Ibid., 9.
11
Ibid.,24.
12
A.T. Mahan was seized upon by the British Admiralty
(excluding Fisher), German Kaiser, and Theodore Roosevelt alike—
there was no question as to the popularity of his treatise The
Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. However, the mass
assembly of navies rested largely in the historical context and
necessity for transporting large armies—Salamis, Normandy (1066),
Lepanto, and Normandy (1944)—and not so much with the idea of
navy battling against navy with few exceptions. This paradigm proved
to be decidedly different from where others like Julian Corbett
believed the future would operate concerning the strategic purpose
of naval power.
13
MacIsaac, 635.
8
Civil Air Patrol Communications:
The Formative Years
Michael Marek
W
hen the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) received its
Congressional charter in 1947, and the
organization transformed from wartime military support
to peacetime missions, it soon became apparent that
radio communications would be essential. It was a time
when telephone calls had expensive per-minute long
distance charges, conference calls were unheard of, and
there were few other communication options for
managing a national organization structured like CAP.
The Air Force tasked Civil Air Patrol to create a High
Frequency (HF) radio system that was characterized by
high mobility and flexibility. In addition, the Air force
expected the system to be at the disposal of Civil
Defense agencies, when not required for direct support
of Air Force missions (Wilson, 1952).
Details of the first steps taken to develop the CAP radio
communications system are hard to find almost 70 years
later, but CAP’s Report to Congress for the year 1947,
reported on the fledgling radio system. It said that in
order to support the organization’s goals for a farreaching flying program, it became necessary to create a
communications network that connected the then-51
wings of the organization (the 48 states, Hawaii, and the
District of Columbia) and its 150,000 members (CAP,
1948). As a result, the Air Force loaned each CAP wing a
“heavy duty radio set” (Wilson, 1952, p.4).
A considerable amount of war surplus communication
equipment was also acquired and the Air Force allocated
two HF radio frequencies to CAP. As of May 1948, over
500 individual CAP-HF stations had been licensed via the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). To
demonstrate the capability of the network at that time,
the annual report verbal presentation to a Congressional
banquet in May of 1947 was transmitted “to all of our
state wings and their components through our own
network” (CAP, 1948, p. 5).
The 1949 National Commander’s Report to Congress
(CAP, 1949) specifically included an organizational
objective of providing “an auxiliary radio net of mobile,
fixed and portable stations to augment the armed forces
and commercial communication systems in case of local,
state and national emergencies” (p. 24). At this point,
3,420 CAP stations had been licensed, including the
original 51 radios loaned by the Air Force, plus many
other radios from “donable property sources” (p. 22).
The radios operated at anywhere from 1 to 400 watts.
Many members, it was reported, already owned
equipment capable of operating on the frequencies
assigned to CAP. Each state had set up, or was in the
process of setting up, a communications training
program. In 1949, CAP was using voice communications
and Morse Code (CW), plus California Wing operated a
radio-teletype system.
The 1949 Commander’s Report proclaimed the
efficiency of the new radio network, which had only
been a plan on paper a year earlier, exemplified by its
functioning during emergency blizzard conditions in the
West (CAP, 1949). The report said that in many cases the
CAP radio network was the only link some isolated
communities had to the outside world during the
blizzards.
T
he 1950 annual report (CAP, 1950) described rapid
growth, with the network passing 6,000
applications for FCC licenses. But the report also
candidly described problems in the system, mostly
stemming from a “lack of ‘know how’ among members”
(p. 6). To address this, CAP’s national headquarters
initiated a program of communications conferences. In
the first year, ten were held around the country, and the
report concluded that “the results were gratifying in
terms of interest and enthusiasm as well as
improvement in efficiency of operation” (p. 6).
1951 marked a growing emphasis on mobile CAP radio
communications (CAP, 1951). Licensed radio stations
had increased to 9,000, but the focus of communications
program management was turning to improving the
structure and discipline of the network. Evoking images
of fixed-base radio stations, the annual report said the
9
network was “called down from the attics and out of the
cellars to roll on wheels – ready to move on a moment’s
notice.” CAP received no new influx of military radio
hardware during 1951, due to the complicated
procedure necessary to process surplus or obsolete
equipment through the General Services Administration.
But 21 September 1951 saw the first major disaster
relief test of the new CAP communications system, a gas
main explosion in Brighton, New York.
The town of Brighton was rocked by a series of
explosions in an underground vault that housed pressure
regulators for gas distribution lines (Jones, Platt &
Berger, 1952). High pressure gas gained entry into many
residences, resulting in an additional disastrous series of
explosions and fires. Three people died and 23 were
injured. Fifteen residences were totally destroyed, 25
were damaged, and unofficial estimates of damage
ranged from $1-1.5 million, or over $9-13 million
in 2014 dollars.
All communication with the outside world was cut off
because many residents heard the news while working
in nearby Rochester. The phone exchange was jammed
by their attempts to telephone home (Auf der Heide,
1989). Civil Air Patrol communicators bridged the gap in
less than an hour (Burnham, 1955). They deployed
mobile radios to critical locations throughout the
community, relaying specific requests for help to a fixed
station outside the disaster area. The CAP emergency
net allowed rescue workers to dispatch the specific
types of needed equipment and assistance to each
affected location.
T
he benefits of CAP’s fleet of mobile radios were
illustrated again in late 1952 when forest fires
swept Virginia (CAP, 1952). “Almost before the word
‘FIRE’ had gone out Civil Air Patrol communicators were
leaving their jobs in shops, offices, plants and garages
heading for the danger zone” (p. 20). The CAP
communicators worked side-by-side with the fire
fighters for two weeks. The annual report noted that
when fire destroyed ground telephone lines to isolated
ranger stations, CAP radio operators took their portable
equipment into the fire zones to furnish
communications, cruising the roads to report the fire
fighters’ progress. Meanwhile, radio-equipped CAP
aircraft orbited above, reporting degree of fire control,
calling attention to new outbreaks, and guiding fire
crews around danger areas. This allowed fire supervisors
to make the best possible distribution of their firefighting assets (Burnham, 1955).
The radio systems in these missions largely used HF
frequencies. The author has heard anecdotal reports of
HF radios mounted in CAP aircraft, circa 1960 or earlier,
which required long trailing wire antennas. The antenna
was manually cranked out after takeoff and cranked
back in before landing. Amplitude modulated VHF
aviation band radios were rare, and few were available
within CAP. It is unclear from historical accounts
which form of aircraft radio was used during
these fire missions.
I
n 1952, Col. William P. Lear was communications
advisor to Air Force Maj. Gen. Lucas V. Beau, the
active duty CAP-USAF commander from 1947-1955
(Barnhart, 2006; Wilson, 1952). The Deputy Chief of Staff
for Communications was Lt. Col. Walter Wilson. Wilson
wrote that the communications staff was developing
plans for a lightweight, portable, battery-powered VHF
radio that could be used in aircraft, automobiles, boats,
and even on horseback or handheld. The organization
made a concerted effort to urge electronics
manufacturing firms to make such a radio for the CAP
market (CAP, 1953). The 1954 annual report (CAP, 1954)
conveyed the good news that the Reisner Corporation of
Hagerstown, Md., was producing a suitable air/ground
VHF radio and that Gonset, Crico, and Lettine were also
producing equipment usable by CAP.
1952 had seen a major reorganization of the CAP
communications system, based on the principal of
“communications is command” (CAP, 1953, p. 20). The
goal of the reorganization was to establish a definite
command-via-radio capability for every commander,
from National Headquarters down to the lowest echelon
of the organization. Commanders and communications
officers were encouraged to decommission fixed
stations and install the equipment in the automobiles of
10
individual members, where they would be of practical
use during operational missions. The effort resulted in a
9:1 ratio of mobile to base stations at the end of 1952,
compared to 5:1 in 1951.
The groundwork was also laid in 1952 for new
standardized training materials and a standardized basic
radio course designed for CAP cadets. Indeed, the 1953
annual report (CAP, 1953) indicated that 5,000 radiotelephone manuals had been printed for training
purposes. An associated instructor’s guide was
reported to have resulted in many radio classes at
the squadron level (CAP, 1954).
I
n the 1950s, the call sign for the National
Headquarters station at Bolling AFB, Washington DC,
was VPØ (Wilson, 1952). Region stations carried
additional numerals matching region numbers used by
CAP, such as VPØ1 at Mitchell AFB for Northeast Region
(Cormier, Goodwin, & Squires, 1959). Following the
launch of the first Russian and American satellites, all of
the VPØ stations transmitted satellite orbital elements
for the general public at scheduled times, to allow
observers to locate them.
Although a wide range of radios and power supplies
were in use in this era, the most popular transmitter was
said to be the Hallicrafters BC-610 (Wilson, 1952). It was
originally built for the U.S. Army Signal Corps during
World War II based on a civilian model, transmitted 500
watts, and was capable of voice and CW/Morse Code
operation (Radiomuseum, n.d.) but it was also large,
heavy, and not very portable.
1953 saw creation of the National Communications
Committee, consisting of selected CAP volunteer
members (CAP, 1953). The 1953 annual report noted
that the impetus for communications planning now
rested with the experienced volunteer communicators
on the committee, as well as with the active duty staff of
the National Commander. Later in its existence, the
National Communications Committee consisted of the
region deputy chiefs of staff for communication, but
the makeup of the group in 1953 was not specified in
the annual report.
By 1954, CAP came to the realization that it had many
inactive radio stations (CAP, 1954). Steps were taken to
weed out these inactive stations so that planning and
reporting could be based on more accurate data. In
addition, restrictions were planned on fixed HF stations
controlled by CAP to eliminate their use for amateur
radio and other unauthorized uses.
Another major event that spurred the
professionalization of the CAP radio system was the
Atlantic seaboard landfall of Hurricane Hazel during the
morning hours of 15 October 1954 (CAP, 1954).
Commercial power went down and commercial
broadcast radio stations were off the air. CAP rescue
workers and mobile units maintained contact with the
outside world, stringing field telephone wires and using
brute force to keep antennas in operation, despite 115
mile per hour winds. Two communicators, Florence
Fitzgerald and Thelma Hale of Richmond, Va., received
bruises and lacerations while fighting to keep their
stations on the air.
CAP’s 1954 hurricane response, as well as its work
during floods on both the Atlantic Seaboard and the
Pacific Coast, had the by-product of improving the
overall efficiency of its radio nets, as well as leading to
changes to give the system even more mobility
(CAP, 1955).
As the result of the hands-on lessons during the
formative years of the CAP Communications system, a
formal Net-type structure evolved to replace the looser
operation of earlier years. The late 1950s, therefore,
marked the transition from a preliminary exploration of
radio use into a structured, professional radio
communications system, frequently passing formal voice
traffic for management of the CAP organization, and for
conducting its missions. The structure of HF nets and
related formal message and operating practices would
serve CAP well for decades.
Michael Marek is a Professor of Electronic Media at Wayne
State College and serves as an Assistant National
Communications Officer at the CAP NHQ.
11
Works Cited: Civil Air Patrol Communications:
The Formative Years
Auf der Heide, E. (1989). Disaster response: Principles of preparation
and coordination. Center of Excellence in Disaster
Management & Humanitarian Assistance.
http://www.sheltercentre.org/sites/default/files/CVMosby
_DisasterResponsePrinciples.pdf
Barnhart, K. (2006). Castle’s core values. Civil Air Patrol Volunteer,
Nov-Dec 2006, 34-35.
http://capnhq.custhelp.com/ci/fattach/get/509/0/filename
/Castle+CAP+CommandersVolunteer_NovDec_06_Final_75dpi-14.pdf
Burnham, F. (1955). CAP to the rescue. Popular Mechanics Magazine,
103(2), 81-88 & 264-270.
http://books.google.com/books?id=390DAAAAMBAJ&print
sec=frontcover
Civil Air Patrol (1948). 1947 Report. Address delivered at the CAP
Congressional dinner, Washington DC, May 1948. Bolling
AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1947_748722E8
D25CA.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1949). Civil Air Patrol Auxiliary of the U. S. Air Force
Annual conference. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1949_00C3A3B
31F036.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1950). Annual Report to Congress 1950. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1950_F403C9F8
22E0C.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1951). Report for Congress for 1951. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1951_FFC3C27
AD1D59.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1952). Annual Report Civil Air Patrol Auxiliary of the
United States Air force for 1952. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1952_8D184B3
F628D7.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1953). Annual Report for the year ended December
31. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1953_83232DB
34E54C.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1954). Annual Report Civil Air Patrol Auxiliary of the
United States Air Force for 1954. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1954_7FCABC0
E127E4.pdf
Civil Air Patrol (1955). Annual Report for the year ended December
31. Bolling AFB: CAP.
http://www.capmembers.com/media/cms/1955_D122092
4549A5.pdf
Cormier, L. N., Goodwin, N., & Squires, R. K. (1959). Simplified
satellite prediction from modified orbital elements. IGY
Satellite Report Series Number 7. Washington D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences.
http://fas.org/spp/military/program/track/predict.pdf
Jones, G. W., Platt, D. H. & Berger, L. B. (1952). Investigation of gas
explosions in Brighton, N. Y., September 21, 1951. United
States Department of the Interior.
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015078469650
Radiomuseum (n.d.). HT 4 / BC-610.
http://www.radiomuseum.org/r/hallicraft_ht_4_ht4.html
Wilson, W. (1952). Mobility of communications. Radio & Television
News, 47(5), 35-37.
http://www.americanradiohistory.com/Archive-RadioNews/50s/Radio-News-1952-05-R.pdf
Call for Submissions
The Civil Air Patrol National Historical Journal (NHJ)
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published.
Editorial changes are at the sole discretion of the editorial
staff, but will be discussed with the author prior to
publication, and require a signed release from the author.
The CAP NHJ editorial staff reserves the right to
refuse any work submitted. All submissions must be
sent as MS Word attachments and mailed to the
editor at kefinger@sercap.us.
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