On Kites and Other Such Matters of Note  
K. J. Efinger

One afternoon a few years back, I mentioned to my friend Wayne that I was unable to attend his Tuesday evening blacksmithing classes due to local CAP unit meetings. Wayne looked at me, scratched his beard, and said “Civil Air Patrol…Granddad often mentioned them.” “Yes,” I said, “They’ve been around for quite some time...what did your grandfather do?” Wayne replied, “Well...for starters, I guess he is identified with what is now the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum, but I think as much recognition is given to him for inventing the “target kite.” My reaction was as tempered as his response, but there was no hiding the fact that I was no longer in a rush to leave that afternoon, and pressed for more information on Paul Garber, and his legacy. I knew of target kites, but little more than the fact that their invention was the result of needing to train gunners on land and at sea. I did not, however, give much attention to their development, or who exactly came up with the idea in the first place—it was rather trivial, and admittedly, I had little interest. That changed when Wayne began to tell me the story as he remembered it from his Grandfather. I suddenly found myself quite interested as he related all he knew of Paul Garber’s invention of the “target kite,” and other such things as how Charles Lindbergh and his Granddad would sit for hours in the senior Garber’s office at the museum. Wayne related how he would listen, play, and absorb so much that was going on in the fascinating and privileged environment around him.

Wayne is a consummate sage—a story-teller par excellence. I experienced this in classic form that one afternoon, and again just the other day when I went by to see if he was interested in telling CAP NHJ readers more about his grandfather. In Wayne’s office is a rather crudely constructed heavy pine bookshelf sitting atop his desk with a thumb-sized knot protruding from each side of the upright support. Countless visitors would stand or sit while listening to some story about this or that—all the while shuttling the large knot back and forth, and sometimes out of place. This was a rite of passage for anyone who knew Wayne and visited him at his work, and this day was no different as I learned more about Paul Garber’s fascinating life than I had on the first occasion. I never knew Paul Garber—as I suspect that few readers of the CAP NHJ did—but somehow I have now made a closer connection to the name I saw every now and again in science periodicals, Smithsonian magazine, and Civil Air Patrol publications.

In the inaugural edition of the CAP NHJ last year, Jill Robb Paulson wrote of her grandfather, CAP legend Gill Robb Wilson. When I spoke with Jill over the phone to discuss what she could add to that very first issue, she said she could only speak of her grandfather as she knew him—not as a CAP founding-father. My response was simple: good. It is nice to
I asked Wayne if he was willing to share more of what life was like around his granddad with the CAP NHJ readers, and Wayne responded that he would not be able to tell much about what he did with the Smithsonian, but that he would certainly be happy to share about who Paul Garber was as a person. “I think that is what readers may want to hear Wayne,” I replied, and we shook on it. I replaced the knot in the bookshelf, tentatively scheduled a time where we would meet again, and thanked Wayne for sharing.

Paul Garber was not a combat veteran; neither was he a man of tall stature, or strong personality. Wayne describes him as being a loving, caring, and involved grandparent whom he spent many years with as a child on into adulthood. I am reminded of a quote from a book I read not too many years ago where the author described a certain individual as an “extraordinary ordinary man.” This is how we may perhaps think of Paul Garber. His invention of the target-kite—which I hope we can highlight at some point in this publication—saved lives. It may be to some a “simple” invention, but a necessary and ingenious one it most certainly was. For this, Paul Garber stands as an extraordinary man—a hero without the pomp and circumstance, and a yet at the same time, an ordinary man who liked to play with his kites to the very end of his intriguing, and impacting life.

The Paul E. Garber award is presented to Civil Air Patrol Senior members after successfully completing Level IV requirements within the Senior Member Professional Development Program. Paul Garber was the first curator of the National Air Museum of the Smithsonian Institution (later National Air and Space Museum (NASM) of the Smithsonian Institution). The Paul E. Garber Preservation, Restoration, and Storage Facility in Suitland, Maryland is named for his lifetime of service and passion for preserving aviation history. CAP NHJ readers can expect an interview with Mr. Wayne Garber in the near future as well as a comprehensive biography of Paul Garber.
Who Flew First?
Frederick G. Herbert

Editor’s note: The controversy of who was “first in flight” will rage well beyond the pages of this journal. It is a seemingly “hot-button” issue in the circles of aviation history. Civil Air Patrol’s Fred Herbert offers a matter-of-fact analysis of some fundamental questions that scholars need to ask—specifically as it relates to any official record, or eyewitness account of a subject so debated as this.

Gustave Whitehead did not invent the airplane as we know it—he tried and failed. So too did Octave Chanute, Samuel Langley, Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell, and Hiram Maxim—all successful inventors who attempted to build a practical airplane and some who could pay for their experiments with their personal fortunes. They all failed to produce a controllable flying machine. Whitehead—like the others—did not have an effective flight control system.

Chanute made his money working in the railroad industry, and designing bridges. Langley procured grants from the Smithsonian Institution and the U.S. Army. Edison and Bell made money from their highly successful inventions and subsequent patents. Hiram Maxim’s development of the automatic-firing gun made him rich. The Wright brothers funding came from the proceeds of their bicycle business in Dayton, Ohio. Whitehead, however, did not have a personal fortune; his funding came from investors. He had to convince these investors that his experiments had a chance of paying off in the end. If his claims did not successfully influence investors, there would be no money for his continued efforts. Stanley Yale Beach invested in Whitehead’s work for many years and said, “I do not believe that any of his machines ever left the ground.” Historian and replica builder Nick Engler says of Whitehead’s various claims, “a pattern emerges. Whitehead claims success, his boasts garner him contracts; but he is unable to deliver on his promises. Then the cycle repeats.”

Every now and again, a claim will surface that Gustave Whitehead flew a powered, manned, and controlled airplane in Bridgeport, Connecticut, in 1901. This was obviously before the Wright brothers’ success at Kitty Hawk. Even though an overwhelming number of aerodynamic scientists and aviation historians agree that the Wright brothers designed, constructed, and flew the first practical airplane, such reports still claim that Whitehead’s success preceded that of the iconographic brothers. The issue becomes even more confused when publications on an international scale such as Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, assert that Gustave Whitehead flew before the Wright brothers as was reported in 2013. In spite of this, the Smithsonian Air & Space Museum’s official position maintains that the Wright brothers were “first in flight.” This designation does not discount the efforts made by the many pioneers mentioned in this critique of the subject. There is no denying that many early aviation experimenters’ powered aircraft managed to leave the ground—one perhaps as early as 1874. The Wright brothers invented a flight control system that was new and novel when Wilbur Wright partially disclosed it in a speech before the Western Society of Engineers in 1901. That specific flight control system was the first to provide safe practical flight, and is still in use today.

The closest research rivaling the Wright brothers was one-time Yale Physics professor, and aviation pioneer Edson Gallaudet. Gallaudet engaged in extensive experimentation of “wing warping” and is celebrated to this day for his success. Unfortunately, it is believed that

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1Crouch, Tom, Who Flew First? (Air & Space, September 2013), 25
2Moolman, Valerie, The Road to Kitty Hawk, (Time-Life Books, 1980), 59
some top Yale administrators did not think it proper for one of their professors to be tinkering with aerodynamic apparatus while other duties demanded his attention. Because of this alleged pressure from the Yale administration, Gallaudet discontinued his research for a season, but eventually established an aircraft production facility along the Thames River in Connecticut not long after the Wright brothers’ flight at Kitty Hawk. In spite of the fact that Gallaudet was not a contender for the distinction achieved by Orville and Wilbur Wright, there can be little doubt as to the mark he left on aviation history.

Wilbur Wright researched all available aviation scientific literature. His study led him to the definition of the “flight problem” as a means of controlling the machine in the air. He and his brother Orville developed their flying machine by engaging in the following steps:

- thorough experimentation of wing warping in 1899, independent of Gallaudet’s work.
- wing warping kite tests at Kitty Hawk in 1900
- glider experiments of the flight control system in 1901.
- development of a successful flight control system thereby solving the flight problem in 1902.
- patent application in March 1903.
- successful powered aircraft flight demonstration in December 1903.

These steps were all part of a proper series of scientific research and development procedures. They applied for the patent of a flight control system—not a flying machine. The Wright brothers never claimed to be the first to get an airplane off the ground; however, they were first to fly under control.

Of eleven airplane experimenters from 1874 to 1903 who claimed heavier-than-air powered flight prior to the Wright brothers, only the Wright brothers’ invention of flight control systems and propeller design are in use today. None of the other flight control designs for powered aircraft were practical before the Wright Brothers, and none are in use today.

The challenge to the Wright brothers “first in flight” status will be an issue in the future as it has been in the past. Whitehead’s supporters are as prolific as any other group in claiming their “favorite son” was first. In its early years, the Smithsonian had been a party to the attempts of Glenn Curtiss to demonstrate that Langley’s 1903 airplane was capable of successful flight, prior to the Wrights, by fraudulently modifying the aircraft structure and control system preceding a test flight. This outraged Orville Wright, and Lindbergh subsequently called it “the dishonesty of commerce.” Orville Wright agreed to allow the Smithsonian to display the Wright brother’s 1903 airplane only as long as they never recognized another airplane as being capable of carrying a man under its own power in controlled flight before the Wright brothers. Obviously, Orville Wright was trying to preclude another dishonest attempt to modify an early experimenter’s airplane and identifying it as capable of controlled flight before the Wright brothers. The Connecticut General Assembly recently established “Powered Flight Day” in Connecticut, choosing to honor Gustave Whitehead as the “first” in powered flight, rather than the Wright brothers. Charles Lindbergh might have called this the “dishonesty of politics.” The fact of the matter is simple: the flight control system developed by the Wright brothers was the so-called “game-changer” and literally made a world of difference, placing them on the top of the shelf among aviation pioneers.

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7Callander, Bruce, Five Smart Men Who Didn’t Invent the Airplane, (AIR FORCE Magazine, January 1990), 88


Col Herbert serves as the NER Historian Emeritus, flew as a CAP mission pilot for over twenty years on search and rescue, disaster relief, and counter-narcotics missions, and commanded the Connecticut CAP Wing. He currently resides in Connecticut.
A Systematic Analysis of Air Doctrine in WWII and The Changing Attitudes Towards Area Bombing (continued)

K.J. Efinger

Dresden 1945 and “Terror Bombing”

The great debate will always be how effective the Allied area bombing was in breaking the German morale, or if it was an act of “international terrorism” on the part of the Allied powers as Manuel Davenport believes in reference to the bombing of Dresden in 1945.1 Nonetheless, the destruction heaped upon Dresden, attests to the ends to which allied air commanders would go in destroying all they could of the German infrastructure and morale. Not all commanders supported the strategies employed against Germany and Maj. Gen. Laurence Kuter went so far as to question Gen. Carl Spaatz on the decisive nature of Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) Directive No. 3, and whether it was not in effect “an official authorization to begin indiscriminate American bombing of population centres” according to McKee.2 Gen. Kuter was concerned with limiting targets to daytime raids, and only those of military significance. According to Davenport, he was not only at odds with General Spaatz, but the British commanders as well—RAF Commander Sir Arthur Harris, and Chief of Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal—regarding the execution of area bombing. As much as he was vocal about his disdain for certain aspects or logistics of area bombing, Gen. Kuter was equally supportive of engaging in “precision bombing” for tactical and moral reasons.”3 The long-term analysis of strategic bombing would indicate that Germany was defeated as a result in part by the persistent and deliberate bombing of cities with some link to military operations. Whether hindsight condemns or exonerates those who made the tactical decisions, is secondary to the fact that Germany finally surrendered, and the pressure applied to the economic “center of gravity” was realized in the infrastructures supported by the cities. Dresden was but one symptom of a war where things were not so neatly wrapped in a package with morality and civility keeping it all tied together.

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1 Dr. Davenport is among those who clearly see the 1945 Allied bombing of Dresden as “case of international terrorism,” and reaches the conclusion based on “detailed information recently available,” although, he does not condemn the act as either reprehensible, or unethical—rather he says that US conduct in WWII was in fact ethical. This is a more pragmatic, and tempered view of Dresden than that offered by Alexander McKee. General Kuter who was very-much opposed to the way in which “area bombing” was being carried-out, was placated by assurances that civilians would be given the greatest consideration. Kuter himself was committed to only going after specifically recognized military targets, and in the end, was not so far removed from the goals of Harris. Manuel M. Davenport, The Leader’s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity and Responsibility, ed. J. Carl Ficcarotta (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001), 142-147.


3 The Leader’s Imperative, 143.
Britain’s Motivation

The British had many reasons to endorse “terror campaigns” against their German cousins, but it was not an official objective—nor was it necessarily anything more than the name given by those detractors and armchair critics who had only to sit back and evaluate the situation from newsrooms and golf courses while enjoying a certain absolution from responsibility. Phillip Meilinger’s constructive criticism of the role played by the British is tempered and logical—in particular when considering the fact that Britain stood largely alone until the United States was forced to officially join in the war against Germany and Japan.

...the British army had been thrown off the continent at Dunkirk—leaving its heavy machinery behind; Axis forces were moving rapidly across North Africa; German submarines were sinking British shipping in the Atlantic at an alarming pace; London was suffering through the blitz; and British bombers had suffered such heavy losses in daylight that they had been driven to the relative safety of the night. In short, Britain was alone, outnumbered, outgunned, and desperate...The choice of Arthur Harris to lead Bomber Command in this dark period was pivotal...Harris initiated an urban bombing campaign against Germany’s major cities, aiming to destroy German morale by targeting residential areas where the workers lived.4

Meilinger says of the changing attitudes and climate leading up to the full-scale practice of area bombing of the cities that, “There is a tendency to read the history of Bomber Command in WWII backwards from Dresden in 1945 to Hugh Trenchard in 1919.”5 There is little accounting for the logistical quagmires that Britain and her allies faced in attempting to sever all lines of communication and transportation. Germany had centers of command and control nestled within cities knowing that there would be no small amount of public outrage over the bombing of major cities—especially ones of historical significance. The criticism leveled at Britain seldom took into account the nature of the war Germany waged against the island nation for nearly a year. The destruction left by German rockets was quickly forgotten as the British began to retaliate as best they could with peripheral support from the Americans and displaced French fighters. The German bombing of Britain, or “London blitz” was impetus enough for people—at least Londoner’s—to overlook any aggressive campaigns the British would take against Germany.

The British, victims of heavy German bombing, adopted a policy of city-area bombing early in the conflict...in the course of the war, the Luftwaffe, V weapons, and long-range guns killed more than 60,000 British civilians. The bombing “blitz” of 1940-41 alone killed 43,000 and wounded 139,000. Many persons in and out of government not only wanted to give back as much as they had gotten but instead wanted to give back more. Some clerics and individuals with exceptionally forgiving and discriminating consciences...opposed area bombing on ethical and humanitarian grounds...American policy towards collateral damage and area bombing lacked the clear and concise definition of British policy and procedure.6

There is no reason to assume that the British would be too forgiving of the Germans after only twenty years separating two wars, the slaughter at Dunkirk, and the unfettered German “blitz” against London and surrounding areas in 1940-41. Philosophically, they would go through changes that would not have been immediately apparent to American forces joining in the fray. It is the kind of transformation that occurs when emotions and experience take precedence and shape policy accordingly. It is the very sort of thing that also took Americans from a place of relative isolationism on December 6, 1941 and the very next day mobilized them to call for war against the nation of Japan an ocean away from relative tranquility.


5 Ibid.

Curiously, the larger disagreements between the Allies centered on the application of air power, and how the bombing raids would be carried out respectively. The fundamental difference between the British and American approach to bombing was more of an operational matter, and one where the Americans sought to specifically engage in daylight targeting. The British were skeptical—as well as fearful—of sending bombers into Germany for daylight raids as the “RAF had concluded that bombers lacked the speed and maneuverability to fend off enemy interceptors by daylight and that no feasible amount of defensive armament could compensate for their disadvantages.”

The Americans appeared to have more concerns about reaching and eliminating the military targets, and were willing to take the risk in order to avoid hitting anything but “vital parts of Germany’s war machine,” according to Gen. Arnold.

Hansell and others have articulated that the philosophical differences between the Americans and British were more than just simple disagreements, but rather strong opinions revealing strained emotions on the matter of daylight v. night bombing. Ultimately, the Americans would prevail in convincing Churchill that it could be done, and it would not only be advantageous, but necessary in order for the bombing to be of strategic, and material value.

Ironically, the American Eighth Air Force would lose fewer bombers than the British during daylight raids on Germany.

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8 Ibid., 108.

9 Meilinger does not specifically state this as fact, but rather alludes to the ambiguity with which the directives were written. The question of course was what exactly constituted a “military target.” Paths of Heaven, 68-69.

10 Neither the AWPD-1, AWPD-42, or any revision to any directive named civilians as a target in and of themselves outside of the expectations that there would be occasions where they were lost to Allied sorties. However, the implication was there from the beginning. Haywood S. Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986), 77.

11 American Way of War, 336.

12 Ibid., 337.

13 Every source examined comes to the consensus that Maj. Gen. Ira Eaker was the pivotal officer who was able to convince the British that they would be successful in daylight bombing. Eaker’s friend, Sir John Slessor, British Vice Air Marshall was also instrumental in moving towards an agreement which eventually found itself drafted in the Casablanca Directive. Hansell, A Memoir, 69-71, 72-77.

14 Paths of Heaven, 253.
According to Overy, and in spite of Galbraith’s hastily uttered criticism of the overall bombing, the results were positive:

Almost all the senior German officials interrogated at the end of the war agreed that the systematic disruption of traffic by bombing was the critical factor in the collapse of the industrial economy from September 1944...The collapse of the rail network split Germany into smaller economic regions which were unable to support armaments production...bombing made it impossible to support a serious economic war effort. Its effects were, according to one senior German official, “catastrophic”...The effects on German morale were equally debilitating. Although bombing did not produce a popular uprising against the German government, nor the complete collapse of war-willingness, all the evidence suggests that the experience of bombing was uniquely demoralizing.\(^\text{15}\)

This is in keeping with the final analysis of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Europe which evidently did not reflect Galbraith’s larger criticism that the entire several years of persistent operations against Germany was of no consequence.

**Conclusion**

The Allies were dubious of Germany’s commitment to avoid civilian casualties. There was more than enough evidence to suggest that Germany was indifferent towards the rules of war established by powers they chose not to recognize. With the circumventing of the Treaty of Versailles, they clearly snubbed their noses at the conditions placed on rearmament and what nature of military they were allowed to create.

The Condor Legion’s exposure to air-combat and close ground support was an invaluable tool that the Germans carried with them into the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. Even though they miscalculated the duration of the war, and were not equipped to carry-out the same air-strategies as the Allied powers, Germany sustained a formidable war machine from September 1939 through May 1945. The air-doctrine applied by Germany and the force used wantonly against Britain would come back to haunt them. They set the tone for how the Allies would ultimately respond, and how the world would perceive them when all was said and done. The British pulled-out as many stops as was practicable; not only to eliminate any chance of Germany again bringing the war to the British Isles, but discreetly to direct campaigns of a punitive nature against population centers in Germany. They had learned from the Germans that centers of gravity could extend well beyond the purely tangible military objectives to include the more oblique psychological effect of reducing morale to the point of either surrender or insurrection. In spite of the fact that neither transpired in Germany, the economic losses were staggering, and directly contributed to the collapse of Nazi Germany and the will of the people to fight.

Finally, there is no evidence (at least any that is of academic consequence) pointing to the American bombing of Dresden as being a “dog and pony” show for the Russians. It disrupted the line of communications as well as flow of materiel from in and out of the city to areas where it was used against the Allies. As to whether or not the raid was “excessive,” the decisions made at the time were more or less to eliminate the potential for Dresden to serve as a means to supply German troops in the field. There is no evidence to the contrary, though the bombings were undoubtedly horrific in Dresden as much as they were in Hamburg and Leipzig.

In the final analysis, the Americans and British were able to put aside philosophical differences, work together, and engage the Germans on the only level that worked to frustrate and destroy the will of the people and economy that fed the Third Reich. The sustained bombing was horrific, but even so, it alone did not win the war, and air-doctrine would be put to the test in two other major conflicts before the end of the twentieth century in which bombing played a major role in attempting to break the will of the enemy.

\(^{15}\) War in the Air, 117.
There was perhaps more success in Europe during WWII, than Korea or Vietnam. Nonetheless, pressure applied accordingly, and steadily was the remedy that the Allied commanders needed to use against Germany in order to win the war. With that in mind, the willingness to compromise and lay aside individual moral convictions had to take precedence in order for the larger picture of a German surrender to take place in the end.

_Capt Efinger is the Deputy Chief of Staff for A5 (Plans, Programs and Requirements) at Southeast Region HQ. He is a full-time teacher of Economics and Adjunct Professor of History at Indian River State College in Ft. Pierce, Fl._

**Earle L. Johnson:**
CAP’s Wartime Commander

*Frank A. Blazich, Jr.*

While the basic history of the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) is broadly known, few members are familiar with the man who led and managed the organization during World War II. A former Ohio State University (OSU) football player, diversified businessman in Cleveland, and three-time member of the Ohio General Assembly, Earle Levan Johnson’s involvement in politics and aviation would culminate in March 1942 with his appointment as national commander of the CAP. Under his tutelage, the organization blossomed during World War II into a viable instrument of homeland security for the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) and later the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF). Although predominantly a civilian-cum-military officer, Johnson's skillful use of his business and political skills of persuasion, public relations savvy and perpetual optimism managed to maintain order and unity among 48 wings and over 200,000 civilian volunteers from 1942 to 1945. Originally designed as a temporary, emergency measure, Johnson saw the CAP through to Congressionally-chartered incorporation prior to his untimely death.

O
n 29 January 1895 in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, Levan Merritt and Nellie (Hartshorn) Johnson welcomed the birth of their son, Earle Levan. In 1903, the family moved west and settled in Painesville, Ohio, making their home on Old Orchard Farm, three miles west of the town. In his formative years, Johnson worked with his father on the farm and attended public schools, graduating from Painesville High School in 1914. That fall, he entered OSU to pursue a college education. At OSU, Johnson was a member of the Alpha Gamma Rho fraternity and played right guard for the Buckeyes on the 1915, 1916, and 1919 football teams. At 6’3” tall and 190 pounds, Johnson was a defensive starter on the 1916 Buckeye football team which won the first Big Ten championship in school history. A member of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps at OSU, he entered military training at Fort Benjamin Harrison (Lawrence, IN) following entry of the United States into World War I. With the death of his father in 1917, however, Johnson returned to Painesville to run the family farm and that of his close friend, David Ingalls, for the duration of the war. He returned to Columbus in 1919 to finish his education, graduating with his Bachelor of Science in agriculture in 1920.1

**1** Francis J. Wardega, ed. Sandra Berman, _Earle Levan Johnson (1895 – 1947): A Register of His Papers, 1803 – 1967_ (Cleveland, OH: Western Reserve Historical Society, 1974), 1;
While Johnson produced food to win the war, his friend Ingalls took to the skies over Northern France to fight for the Allied cause. In 1917, Ingalls enlisted in the United States Navy’s (USN) aviation branch and arrived in France in September. During combat in 1918, Ingalls became the first fighter ace in the history of the USN (and only USN ace in World War I). After the war, Ingalls would finish a degree at Yale in 1920 before earning an LLD from Harvard and entering the law profession. Maintaining his close friendship with Johnson, Ingalls’ aviation experiences would greatly influence Johnson in the 1920s and serve as the catalyst for Johnson’s pursuit of a pilot’s license at the end of the decade.2

Following graduation, Johnson returned to Painesville to pursue his fortune. On 15 October 1921, he married Miss Doris Doan of Cleveland and vigorously engaged himself in business activities in the Cleveland area. He established the Johnson Land and Building Company and the Earlevan Realty Company to fuel an interest in real estate. He served as vice president for the Northern Ohio Insurance Corporation and worked as a sales representative for Cadillac and LaSalle Motor Cars in Cleveland.3

“Civil Air Patrol Headed by Ohio Stater,” Ohio State University Monthly, May 1943; draft registration card for Earle Levan Johnson, 5 June 1917, Ancestry.com, U.S. World War I Draft Registration Cards, 1917–1918 [database online]; Ohio State University, Forty-Third Annual Commencement (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1920), 14; War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, Dudley M. Outcalt to Air Inspector, on “Survey of the Civil Air Patrol,” 8 March 1944, 18, folder 3, Earle Levan Johnson Papers (ELJP), Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH (WRHS), Box 5; Junior Class of The Ohio State University, eds., The Makio 1917, vol. 35 (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University, 1917), 159, 173; Junior Class of The Ohio State University, eds., The Makio 1920, vol. 39 (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University, 1920), 120.

Johnson listed on his draft card that he was supporting his mother, and the registrar commented that he thought Johnson’s reporting for service not necessary for this hardship.


3 “Marriages,” Ohio State University Monthly 13, no. 1 (October 1921): 48; Wardega, Johnson, 1; advertisement, “Cleveland

After the death of his father, Johnson found himself assuming his father’s position on the Lake County Republican Central Committee in 1917. In 1926, Johnson and Ingalls both won elections to the Ohio House of Representatives, the first of three consecutive terms for Johnson. While members of the Ohio General Assembly, Ingalls began to cultivate and refine Johnson’s interest in aviation. Beginning in 1928, Johnson and Ingalls served together on the Ohio Joint Legislative Committee on Aviation to recommend aviation legislation for the state. In January 1929, Johnson earned his private pilot’s license. Two months later in March, Ingalls introduced the Ohio Aeronautics Act to establish the Ohio Bureau of Aeronautics under the office of the Secretary of State. Passed unanimously by the Ohio General Assembly, the act represented the first general aviation law in Ohio.4

Johnson and Ingalls often flew together from Cleveland to Columbus for their legislative duties. In April 1930, Johnson earned his commercial pilot’s license and purchased his own aircraft, flying them from a field he constructed on his farm in Painesville. In 1931, he sat on has changed its mind about Used Cars,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 23 May 1926, 16C.

the Ohio Aviation Committee and was named a trustee of Lake Erie College for Women. The following year, Johnson managed Ingalls’ unsuccessful campaign for the Ohio governor’s office. With the inauguration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1933 and passage of the twenty-first amendment, Johnson became vice president of the Leisy Brewing Company. Prior to the outbreak of war, he became president of the I and J Hardware Company, also in Cleveland. Although no longer an elected official, Johnson retained a strong interest in aviation and kept active in his community. He participated in the Lake County YMCA, served as chairman of the “Come to Cleveland Committee” of the Cleveland Advertising Club, and held memberships in the Masons, Odd Fellows, Rotary International, University Club, and the Cleveland Big Ten Club, among others.5

Johnson’s absence from politics would be short-lived. On 3 August 1939, Ohio Governor John Bricker appointed Johnson as director of the Ohio Bureau of Aeronautics. He remained as director until 1945, when the bureau was replaced by the Ohio Aviation Board. As director, Johnson’s early work involved assisting with the Civilian Pilot Training Program (CPTP) established by the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA). The CPTP program intended to train and create a large reservoir of civilian pilots, whereby selected aviators could be chosen for advanced training as military pilots in the event of war. Johnson and the Aeronautics Bureau assisted Ohio communities and developers in the construction of airports to feed the increasing national defense effort. In promoting aviation in the state, Johnson and the bureau began to court aircraft manufacturers to construct plants in Ohio to meet the burgeoning demand for aircraft and spare parts by the War and Navy Departments.6

The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 and German military success in Western Europe in 1940 stirred aviation enthusiasts in the U.S. to action. Independently and then collectively, people began to consider means to organize and utilize the nation’s civilian aviators for defense purposes. In Toledo, Milton Knight, vice president of the Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company, incorporated the Civilian Air Reserve (CAR) on 17 November 1938. The organization intended to “plan, develop, organize, sponsor and carry into effect a program for developing and maintaining a broader interest in aviation,” and sought to “promote the further development, experience and training of amateur flyers and others interested in aviation in a manner that would enable them to be of substantial value in any program of national defense and in any period of national emergency.” Organized along military lines with ranks and uniforms, the organization’s volunteer pilots and aircraft practiced formation flying, navigation, meteorology, radio communication, aerial photography, theory of flight, and aircraft and engine maintenance to augment the nation’s air defense forces should the government request their services.7

Subsequent CAR units developed across the country from 1939 to 1941. From the original Toledo unit, CAR units formed in numerous states, including Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New York, Utah, Florida, and Colorado. In July 1940, shortly after the fall of France and with the Battle of Britain barely a week old, Knight began to schedule a national

5 “Resume of Flying and Training Experience of Major Earle L. Johnson,” undated, folder 1, ELJP, WRHS, Box 7; Walker S. Buel and Fletcher Knebel, “Ohio Under the Dome: Maj. Earle L. Johnson is Proud of Trick Index of Civil Air Patrol and Work Flyers Do,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 19 July 1942, 16A; Rossano, Hero of the Angry Sky, 330; Wardega, Johnson, 1-2; “Regrets Error in Brewery Heads,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 3 April 1938, 33A; “Biographical Data on Civil Air Patrol Staff,” folder 3, ELJP, WRHS, Box 4; “Earle Johnson Dies in Air Crash Here: Crew Chief and Hiker Also Lose Lives with Civil Air Patrol Head,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 17 February 1947, 1, 3.


7 Civilian Air Reserve, Organization Handbook, 3-10.
convention to establish a permanent, national Civilian Air Reserve. In October 1940, the Aeronautical Advisory Council for the CAA appointed Knight to chair a committee to plan for the establishment of a national program. The same year, the Airplane Owners and Pilots Association launched a similar organization, the Civil Air Guard.8

Prior to Knight’s work, Gill Robb Wilson foresaw the use of the nation’s civilian aviation resources for war following a visit to Germany in 1936. A veteran aviator from World War I, editor of the New York Herald Tribune aviation page, president of the National Aeronautics Association (NAA), and director of the New Jersey Bureau of Aviation, Wilson was convinced that war was imminent. Throughout the summer and fall of 1940, he used the NAA to urge support for the Civilian Air Reserve and Civil Air Guard efforts, albeit as a private and not exclusively federal effort.9

In March 1941, just prior to the Office of Civilian Defense’s establishment on 20 May, the Aeronautical Advisory Council’s committee recommended that a Civil Air Reserve be formed under the CAA. This program would organize civilian aviation assets in each state to supplement regular military forces in the event of emergency. Months later, OCD director Fiorello LaGuardia, himself a former World War I aviator, appointed an aviation committee for the OCD to develop a blueprint to organize civilian aviation resources nationally. LaGuardia’s committee included Wilson, publisher Thomas H. Beck, and newspaperman Guy P. Gannett. The men crafted a program known as the Civil Air Defense Service, using civilian flyers for home defense and disaster relief in the event of a national emergency. Wilson first put the plan to work in New Jersey in July, with operational objectives including aerial liaison, assisting with civilian evacuation in emergencies, guarding public works and industrial areas, and supplementing and assisting military aviation. Wilson’s Civil Air Defense Service program would serve as the direct model for the Civil Air Patrol.10

Johnson kept abreast of these national developments and maintained correspondence with Knight. In late August 1941, Johnson called a meeting of civilian flyers in Ohio to help develop a Civil Air Defense unit for Ohio. On 19 September 1941, Johnson publicly announced the creation of the Ohio Wing of Civil Air Defense Service and recruiting for the wing commenced on 22 September. Johnson saw this organization as a means to counter military authorities’ possible grounding of civilian aviation in the event of war.


A volunteer organization, the wing would be organized like the Army Air Corps, with a training program much like the CAR. The ultimate goal, as Johnson articulated to potential members, would be to create “better disciplined, better informed, and more effective civil air personnel—a personnel which is equipped to render efficient auxiliary service if the nation goes to war or a personnel which will be constructively better fitted for civil aviation if war should be avoided.”

With the establishment of the Civil Air Patrol on 1 December 1941, Johnson shifted his development of the Ohio Wing of Civil Air Defense to conform to the new CAP plans. On 24 December, he went to Washington to serve as the Assistant Executive Officer for the CAP. On 27 January, national CAP commander, Major General John F. Curry, appointed Johnson as executive officer at national CAP headquarters, replacing Wilson. In late March, the Army assigned Curry as commander of the Fourth District Air Corps Technical Training Command, and elevated Johnson to the position of national commander of the CAP. Appointed as national commander of the CAP on 24 March 1942 and commissioned as a captain in the USAAF, Johnson formally assumed the command of the CAP on 1 April. For the remainder of World War II, he built the CAP into a viable instrument for the nation’s defense. Throughout the war, the organization conducted an array of missions and programs, including antisubmarine coastal patrol, courier service for war industries, border patrol, target towing and tracking, and a cadet program for the USAAF. By 1945, over 200,000 civilians had participated in CAP nationwide.

Johnson frequently toured the nation on inspection tours. Flying himself, he visited bases, squadrons, and wings to learn first-hand of operational difficulties, boost morale, and aid in war bond and membership drives. A charismatic leader and enthusiastic promoter, Johnson was not without fault, particularly in his military duties at CAP National Headquarters. A USAF inspector general reported deficiencies and low morale at the headquarters, deeming it “disorganized and chaotic.” While holding Johnson accountable as the commander, the inspector spoke well of the man: “It is probably fair to state that essentially Colonel Johnson is a civilian heading a civilian organization. He has the confidence and loyalty of the civilian members of the CAP. He has advanced their cause and under his leadership this civilian organization has grown to large proportions.” Rather than discipline or remove Johnson from command, the inspector recommended assigning him those duties within his capabilities.

In response, Johnson initiated the requested changes and the CAP continued to improve as an organization. Johnson rose to the rank of colonel in the USAAF on 5 June 1944, and for his wartime leadership of the CAP the Army awarded him the Legion of Merit. Johnson’s other wartime decorations included the Army Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the American Campaign Medal, and World War II Victory Medal.

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11 Milton Knight to Earle L. Johnson, 26 August 1941; Milton Knight to Earle L. Johnson, 3 September 1941; Earle L. Johnson to Fellow Pilot, 25 September 1941, folder 1, ELJP, WRHS, Box 7; document titled “Ohio State Private Flyers Convention, August 30th, 31st, September 1st, 1941;” document titled “Ohio Wing of Civil Air Defense,” folder 2, ELJP, WRHS, Box 5; James D. Hartshorne, “Ohio’s Pilots to Join Civil Defense Wing: Recruiting of 3,740 for Patrol Operations to be Started Monday,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 20 September 1941, 1.

12 John W. Bricker to Fiorello H. LaGuardia, 23 December 1941; Fiorello H. LaGuardia to John W. Bricker, 16 December 1941, folder labeled “Defense F.H. LaGuardia,” GJWB, OHS, Box 29; “Meet the National Commander – Maj. Earle L. Johnson, AAF,” Buckeye Wing News (Columbus, OH), 7 December 1942; press release from Governor’s Office, 2 January 1942, folder labeled “Bureau of Aeronautics,” GJWB, OHS, Box 16; Dallas Dort to Earle L. Johnson, 2 January 1942, folder 1, ELJP, WRHS, Box 3; “Ohio Director Aeronautics to Capital,” Times Recorder (Zanesville, OH), 3 January 1942, 1; “Staff Announcements,” Civil Air Patrol Bulletin, 27 January 1942, 3; “New National Commander,” Civil Air Patrol Bulletin, 27 March 1942, 1; Outcalt, “Survey of the Civil Air Patrol,” 2; U.S. National Cemetery Internment Control Form for Johnson, Earle L., Ancestry.com, U.S. National Cemetery Internment Control Forms, 1928 – 1962, [database online]. The exact periods of Johnson’s commissioning and promotions is unclear without his personnel file. In studies of his correspondence and existing records, he was commissioned as a captain on 24 March 1942, promoted to major in early May 1942, and rose to lieutenant colonel in April 1943.

In April 1945, the Army reassigned Johnson and the CAP headquarters staff to the 2000th Army Air Forces Base Unit in Fort Worth, Texas. He subsequently was assigned to the Army-Navy Liquidation Committee for the disposal of surplus aircraft in North Africa, receiving the European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal for his work. Johnson returned to the states and resumed command of the CAP in the spring of 1946.¹⁴

On 16 February 1947, Johnson lifted off from the present-day Cleveland Hopkins International Airport at the controls of a C-45 Expeditor, an aircraft he flew throughout the war. Accompanying Johnson were USAAF Staff Sergeant Kenneth Wood of Williamsport, Pennsylvania and USMC Private Edward J. Malovic of Cleveland, who was hitching a ride back to Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina. Shortly after takeoff at around 2,000 feet, one of the aircraft’s engines reportedly exploded. The aircraft nosed over and plummeted to the ground, crashing in the suburb of North Royalton just before 1:00PM. All three men aboard the aircraft died on impact. At the time of Johnson’s death, his promotion to brigadier general was pending before the Senate Armed Forces Committee. The previous month, Army Air Forces Chief of Staff General Carl Spaatz had recommended Johnson for the Army Distinguished Service Medal in recognition of his “inspiring leadership and devotion to duty” in leading the CAP. Both honors would be awarded posthumously. Johnson received full military honors as he was laid to rest in a private service at Arlington National Cemetery.¹⁵

Without Johnson’s steady leadership and promotion of the CAP through its infancy in 1942, the organization may not have survived the end of World War II. Whereas the OCD ceased to exist in the summer of 1945, by the summer of 1943 CAP’s success in coastal patrol operations had proven their worth to the army and navy. On 29 April 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9339, transferring the CAP to the War Department, thereby making the CAP the auxiliary of the USAAF, and later the USAF. CAP’s postwar permanence would be secured on 1 July 1946, when President Harry S. Truman signed Public Law 79-476 into law, incorporating the Civil Air Patrol. Ever the skilled promoter, Johnson served as toastmaster that previous March for a dinner in honor of Truman, the 79th Congress, and General of the Army Henry H. “Hap” Arnold. The dinner, together with a blitz of joint CAP – USAAF airshows undoubtedly helped raise CAP’s profile to the President, Congress, and the American people.¹⁶

In a eulogy in the Congress, members of the House of Representatives paid tribute to Johnson. Congressman John M. Vorys of Ohio declared how “Only a man with the energy and resourcefulness and tact and ingenuity and force of Earle Johnson could have organized and

¹⁴ Earle L. Johnson to Commanding General, Army Air Forces, about “Report of Air Inspector’s Investigation of Civil Air Patrol dated 8 March 1944,” 31 August 1944; Earle L. Johnson to Commanding General, Army Air Forces, 14 October 1944, folder 3, ELJP, WRHS, Box 5; “Civil Air Patrol’s Chief Now Colonel,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 6 June 1944, 11; “Civil Air Patrol Chief Dies with Two Others in Crash,” New York Times, 17 February 1947, 3; Headquarters 32d Army Air Force Base Unit (CAP), Special Orders No. 81, 12 April 1945, folder 2, ELJP, WRHS, Box 1; “National Commander on Foreign Duty,” Civil Air Patrol Bulletin, 27 July 1945, 1; Wardega, Johnson, 2; Neprud, Flying Minute Men, 113-115. The 2000th AAF Base Unit became the third national headquarters of the CAP. See Leonard A. Blascovich, “Home is Where the Hearth is!” Civil Air Patrol Historical Monograph. Other decorations based upon examination of photographs of Johnson during the war and prior to his death.


directed the vast volunteer organization of the CAP in war and peace.” Congressman John Edgar Chenoweth of Colorado noted that “Aviation in this country suffered a heavy loss in his passing,” and called Johnson “an expert flyer . . . tireless in his leadership of the Civil Air Patrol.” Listing his service to Ohio and as leader of the CAP, Ohio Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton concluded that “The Nation can ill afford to lose such a man.” Although his contributions are often forgotten today, Johnson’s legacy lives on in the CAP he helped develop from a temporary wartime to a permanent, postwar organization.17

Maj Frank A. Blazich, PhD is the Chief Historian at NHQ, and serves as Historian, U.S. Navy Seabee Museum, Port Hueneme, CA.

Author’s Corner:
Richard Mulanax

Eyes on the Home Skies: Seventy-Five Years of the Civil Air Patrol

As the seventy-fifth anniversary closes in, a new book will be written, encompassing all of Civil Air Patrol’s history. From the development of ideas and concepts in the 1930s, to the operations of the present day, this book will be an edited work, with each chapter covering a time period written by a different CAP historian. These chapters will average around 30 pages with footnotes and illustrations. The intention is not to create a coffee table piece but rather a quality history of value to the membership and the American public.

The National Historical Editor, Lt Col Richard Mulanax, will serve as the overall editor of this volume. The goal is to seek publication through Air University Press or a suitable nationally-recognized publishing house. By early 2014, the five needed CAP historians will be selected and contacted with specifics about the research requirements and formatting. Chapter drafts must be returned by fall 2014 to allow editing and revisions, at which point the overall introduction and conclusion will be drafted. The complete manuscript will be sent to the publisher by the summer of 2015 with a scheduled publication and release of book by mid- to late 2016.

If you are interested in having your name considered as a potential author, and can approach the project with a serious commitment to researching and writing, please contact Lt Col Richard Mulanax for more information at the address listed below:

Lt Col Richard Mulanax, PhD: richmulanax@gmail.com.

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“Letters to the Editor” will be published at the discretion of the CAP National Historical Editor, and the Chief Historian at CAP NHQ. The CAP NHJ staff is not required to respond to, or publish submissions.